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ABSTRACT 
The operational environment faced by today’s service members is characterized by 
continued deployments to combat zones where large segments of the active duty 
population experience stressful deployments throughout their enlistments.  This study 
examines how battlefield experiences affect retention and attrition behavior among first-
term enlisted personnel. The data for this thesis comes from the Defense Manpower Data 
Center and the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center.  A multivariate analysis using 
probit models was used to estimate effects  
Analyses of the models indicate that the effects of combat experiences on first-
term enlisted retention and attrition rates vary depending on the Service.  Witnessing the 
death or injury of enemy combatants while deployed increases the attrition rates among 
soldiers and Marines but decreases the attrition rates for sailors and airmen.  Exposure to 
destroyed military vehicles leads to decreases in attrition rates among soldiers, sailors, 
and Marines while airmen experience an increased attrition rate. 
Among service members who have completed at least 36 months of active duty 
service (24 months for three-year contracts) combat exposure that is statistically 
significant generally increases retention among service members in the Army and Air 
Force but decreases retention rates for service members in the Navy and Marine Corps. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
As the Global War on Terror (GWOT) reaches its 10th anniversary, an increasing 
number of service members have experienced common combat stressors while deployed, 
such as feeling their lives were in danger, seeing dead or seriously injured service 
members, enemies, and civilians, and the responsibility for the death of an enemy 
combatant,.  However, there is little information on whether these experiences have an 
adverse effect on a service member’s decision to reenlist and the extent to which combat 
stress results in a service member’s early attrition before their military obligation is 
complete.   
The current environment faced by today’s service members is characterized by 
continued deployments to combat zones where large segments of the active duty 
population now experience stressful and repeated deployments over the length of their 
contracts.  In this environment, service members have experienced more deployment 
stressors than in any other recent time, including the first Gulf War.  Previous studies 
have examined how deployment duration and tempo have affected retention, with most 
finding a positive effect on retention.  Prior studies have also linked deployment 
characteristics and combat exposures to a host of mental health conditions such as PTSD 
and depression (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006; U.S. Army MHAT Reports I-V, 
2003–2009).  However, no studies have examined which combat experiences may 
specifically cause a service member to attrite early or reenlist.  Such information is 
critical for manpower planning. 
B. PURPOSE 
This thesis will examine how specific battlefield experiences encountered during 
recent deployments affect retention and non-EAS attrition behavior among first term 
enlisted personnel in the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.  Specifically, 
this research explores the predictive effects of battlefield experiences on first-term 
retention while controlling for varying levels of combat exposure, deployment tempo, 
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and demographic characteristics.  The objective is to determine whether battlefield 
experiences such as firing a weapon, witnessing the death or injury of individuals, and 
exposure to destroyed military vehicles have a significant impact on career decisions and 
if those who experience combat exposure during military deployments differ from those 
who do not in their reenlistment behaviors or early separation rates.  Research will 
include a multivariate model to predict the probability of retention and non-EAS attrition 
given certain battlefield conditions experienced during service members’ deployment.  In 
order to successfully predict reenlistment decisions in the current era, the model must 
control for conditions that affect a service members’ decision to reenlist or separate, none 
being more influential than deployments to Operation Iraqi/Enduring Freedom.   Adding 
variables that capture the effects of combat experiences to the prediction model enables 
manpower planners to properly account for changing conditions in the “Long War.” 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Questions 
a. How do specific combat experiences affect first-term enlisted retention 
and attrition rates? 
b. Is there a difference in retention or attrition rates between those who 
experience combat exposure in Iraq or Afghanistan and those who experience combat 
exposure elsewhere? 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This analysis can help planners better predict accession and recruitment goals in 
the GWOT environment as well as in the future.  This study will provide insight on what 
specific combat deployment experiences and stressors contribute to service member’s 
decision to attrite or reenlist. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of the thesis will include a population of all first term enlisted service 
members who enlisted in calendar years 2002 and 2003.  The sample consists of two 
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population types.  The treatment group is those that have been deployed at least once 
during their initial enlistment contract and subsequently completed a Post-Deployment 
Health Assessment (PDHA). The study will compare this group’s reenlistment and 
attrition rates to the control group, those that did not deploy.  A number of demographic 
variables will be controlled for such as; race, age, gender, military occupational specialty, 
military rank, marital status.   
Estimating the effects of battlefield experiences on reenlistment and non-EAS 
attrition behavior is complicated by the potential endogeneity of battlefield experiences.  
Those who remain in the service long enough to participate in a deployment are the only 
ones remaining in the sample to be analyzed.  Those service members who experienced a 
deployment may be inherently predisposed to stay or leave their jobs irrespective of their 
battlefield experiences; especially those who complete multiple deployments during their 
initial contract.  The model will account for deployment characteristics (such as location, 
length, and/or frequency) in addition to combat experiences. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II provides a review of 
existing literature on the effects of deployment on military personnel related to the thesis.  
Chapter III describes the data sources and a brief background of the Post-Deployment 
Health Assessment program.  Chapter IV explains the dependent variables, key 
independent variables, and other control variables used in this thesis.  Chapter V details 
the analytical method and multivariate probit regression models employed in the analysis.  
The dependent variables include whether a service member stays past their initial 
obligation (reenlistment) and a service member’s Non-EAS separation (attrition).  The 
key independent variables measure a service member’s combat exposure during 
deployments and measure whether a service member fired their weapon during 
deployment, saw killed, dead, or wounded individuals, or was inside or entered destroyed 




presents the results of the multivariate analysis.  Chapter VIII provides conclusions and 
recommendations based on the results obtained in the analysis including areas for further 
research. 
G. SUMMARY 
This thesis will examine how specific battlefield experiences encountered during 
recent deployments affect retention and non-EAS attrition behavior amongst first-term 
enlisted personnel.  The results of this study will be of value to manpower planners in 
determining the reenlistment and attrition probabilities of service members who served in 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom and, more specifically, who were 
exposed to combat experiences. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The current environment facing U.S. military members is characterized by 
lengthy and repeated deployments to combat locations with little time home between 
deployments.  There have been several recent studies that examine the relationship 
between hostile deployment and retention using the receipt of Hostile Fire Pay as an 
indicator of a hostile deployment. However, no study has pinpointed what specific 
battlefield experiences may impact reenlistment behavior or attrition rates.  Several 
studies have used focus groups and surveys along with administrative data to link 
subjective measures of deployment experiences to reenlistment intentions and actual 
reenlistment behavior.  Studies have examined the relationship between specific 
responses on the PDHA and prevalence of mental health problems and military 
separation in the year following a combat deployment.  However, there have been no 
studies that seek to link directly specific aspects of combat exposure to reenlistment and 
attrition rates.   
B. DEPLOYMENT AND RETENTION PRE-9/11 
James Hosek’s and Mark Totten’s analysis, “Does Perstempo hurt Reenlistment? 
The Effect of Long or Hostile Perstempo on Reenlistment” examined whether long 
separation or hostile duty affected the reenlistment of active duty enlisted personnel.  
Hosek and Totten used the Perstempo file covering fiscal years 1988–1996 provided by 
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  The authors contend that there are no 





Separation Allowance1 (FSA) to measure long deployments and Hostile Fire Pay2 (HFP) 
to identify hostile deployments (Hosek & Totten, 1998).   
Hosek and Totten find large coefficients for the variable capturing long or hostile 
deployments, which indicates that there are major differences in reenlistment 
probabilities for those with and without hostile deployments, especially among first-term 
personnel (p. 42).  When the authors analyzed whether long or hostile duty, measured in 
months during a 24-month timeframe, affected the service member’s probability to 
reenlist, they found that members who had some months of long or hostile duty were 
more likely to reenlist than those who had not experienced hostile duty.  Additionally, as 
the number of deployed months increased, the probability of reenlisting decreased and 
the decrease occurred more rapidly for hostile months than for non-hostile months 
(Hosek & Totten, 1998, p. xv). 
When non-hostile months, hostile months, and number of deployment are 
measured, Hosek and Totten report that total deployed months generally have a negative 
effect on reenlistment, and hostile months tend to have an even greater negative effect (p. 
43).  Non-hostile months deployed have a statistically significant negative effect on 
reenlistment for Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel; whereas months deployed to a 
hostile environment are negative and statistically significant for all first-term personnel 
except those in the Air Force.  For example, a first term Army soldier at his/her 
reenlistment point is .30 less likely to reenlist for each non-hostile month deployed and 
for each hostile month deployed is another .086 less likely to reenlist (Hosek & Totten, 
1998, p. 43). 
Hosek and Totten also examined whether specific deployment episodes affected 
reenlistment probabilities finding an increased probability of reenlistment for each of the 
services for a member with one or more non-hostile deployments compared to those with 
                                                 
1 According to DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, Family Separation Allowance 
(FSA) is payable to service members when separated by their dependents for more than 30 consecutive 
days.  Single service members with no dependents are not entitled to this special deployment pay. 
2 According to DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14 a  service member may be paid HFP 
for duty subject to hostile fire or imminent danger for any month when the member is subjected to hostile 
fire or explosions of hostile mines or is killed or wounded by hostile actions. 
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no deployments.  Another feature of deployment episodes is that hostile episodes have a 
negative effect on reenlistment and the probability of reenlistment decreases as the 
number of hostile episodes increased, especially in the Army and Marine Corps (Hosek & 
Totten, 1998, p. 46).   
Overall, Hosek, and Totten find that both the length of deployment and dangerous 
duty has a negative impact on reenlistment probabilities if the duration is long enough or 
there are too many hostile episodes.  They find that having some long (greater than 30 
days deployed) or some hostile months deployed (received HFP) have a positive impact 
on reenlistment, as compared with having no such perstempo; but as the months deployed 
increases or becomes hostile it can potentially reduce reenlistment.  The authors cite 
survey findings that many are interested in military service for the adventure and travel or 
because of a sense of patriotism.  Hosek and Totten hypothesize that non-hostile 
deployments fulfill the need for adventure and travel that many seek and therefore 
increase reenlistment probabilities (p. 57).    
C. DEPLOYMENT AND RETENTION POST-9/11  
James Hosek and Francisco Martorell in their study entitled, “How Have 
Deployments During the War on Terrorism Affected Reenlistment?” examined the 
context of hostile deployments during the “War on Terror” and reenlistment behavior.  
As in Hosek and Totten’s 1998 study, the authors identified hostile deployments through 
the receipt of Hostile Fire Pay (HFP)3, but covered the period 1996 through 2007. In 
addition to administrative files on personnel and pay, Hosek and Martorell used 10 Status 
of Forces Surveys of Active Duty Personnel administered over the internet from 2002 to 
2005.  The inclusion of these surveys allowed the authors to include data not found in the 
administrative files. The surveys provided measures of a member’s well-being in the 
                                                 
3 At the time of the study, areas eligible for HFP included Afghanistan, Algeria, areas of the Arabian 
Peninsula and adjoining sea areas, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, East Timor, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, areas of Greece, Haiti, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordon, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, 
Montenegro, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tajikistan, areas of Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen (Hosek & Martorell, 
2009). 
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military, such as work stress, personal stress, intention to stay in the military, number of 
days longer than usual work day, whether time away was less or more than expected, and 
individual and unit preparedness (Hosek & Martorell, 2009, p. xiv).   
Hosek and Martorell (2009) contrasted their findings with Hosek and Totten 
(1998), since both studies compare the time period before 9/11 and hostile deployments 
are similarly measured by receipt of HFP.  Hosek and Martorell find hostile deployments 
in the year prior to a service member’s reenlistment decision had a positive effect on 
reenlistment before (and for a period after) 9/11 for first-term personnel in the Army, but 
had no significant effect on Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force personnel (p. 44).  
Conversely, Hosek and Totten (1998) find a negative effect of hostile deployment 
episodes on reenlistment probabilities (p. 46).  Both studies find that too many months 
deployed to an area eligible for HFP have a negative effect on reenlistment.  Similar to 
Hosek and Totten (1998), Hosek and Martorell (2009) find that having some4 months of 
hostile deployment has a positive effect for first-term Army personnel from 1996 through 
2001 while having seven to eleven months of hostile deployments had a negative effect 
on Marine personnel reenlistment probabilities during that same time (p. 50). 
Since the administrative data used by Hosek and Martorell covers a time period in 
which the nature and intensity of deployments and threats faced by service members 
varied, they can measure how the hostile deployment effect on reenlistment behavior 
changed from 1996 through 20075.  For service members who had a hostile deployment 
in the year prior to their reenlistment decision, Hosek and Martorell (2009) found that 
among first-term sailors, hostile deployments did not display any trends on reenlistment 
behavior (p. 43). Among Air Force personnel the results demonstrated a stable and 
positive effect over time (p. 45).  For Army personnel hostile deployments had a positive 
effect on reenlistment through 2004, began decreasing, and in 2006 hostile deployments 
began to have a negative effect on first (and second) term reenlistment (Hosek & 
                                                 
4 ‘Some’ is defined as having 1–6 months or 7–11 months of HFP in the 36 months preceding the 
reenlistment decision. 
5 Major ground operation in Iraq began in 2003 and continued throughout the time period studied with 
vary levels of intensity.  Operations in Afghanistan also occurred during the period; while fewer troops 
served there as more began serving multiple tours in Iraq. 
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Martorell, 2009, p. 43).  Marine personnel show deployment effects close to zero (for 
those in their first-term) and exhibit no trend though 2005; in 2006 and 2007 hostile 
deployments have an increasingly positive effect on reenlistment for Marines completing 
a hostile deployment in the year prior to their reenlistment decision (Hosek & Martorell, 
2009, p. 45). 
Narrowing their focus to the post-9/11 era (2002–2007), the authors examined 
deployment effects on reenlistment behavior using three specifications for Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) controls.  Across all three MOS specifications and across 
all services, deployment to a non-hostile location had a positive and statistically 
significant estimated effect on reenlistment.  When controlling for occupation, hostile 
deployments had a negative effect on reenlistment for Army and Navy personnel and a 
positive effect on Marine personnel.  The authors also found that the magnitude of the 
hostile deployment estimate increased when controlling for occupation, which indicates 
that hostile deployments may be more likely in occupations that have lower reenlistment 
rates (Hosek & Martorell, 2009, p. 41).   
Using responses from the Status of Forces Surveys, Hosek and Martorell found 
that among respondents6, hostile deployments had a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with the likelihood of intention to reenlist for all first-term service members 
(p. 33).  This result is different from Hosek et al (2006), who found that the intention to 
reenlist was not affected by hostile deployments except for Army Personnel.  The 
divergence in these studies could be due to the increasing strain on the military over time, 
which was first experienced by Army personnel. The earlier study examined reenlistment 
intentions using surveys administered in July 2003, while the later study used survey and 
administrative data collected from 2002 to 2005. 
The analysis of survey responses when compared to actual reenlistment behavior 
found that although hostile deployments decreased the intention to reenlist, hostile 
                                                 
6 35,000 individuals are sampled during each survey.  Approximately 10, 000 completed the survey 
and non response was higher among junior and enlisted personnel.  The survey administers (DMDC) 
produce weights that adjust for errors in sampling design and survey non-response (Hosek & Martorell, 
2009). 
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deployments had a small and not statistically significant effect on actual reenlistment, 
except for Army personnel who were about six percentage points less likely to reenlist.  
The authors hypothesize that the difference between survey and personnel data could be 
due to the fact that survey respondents may have intended not to reenlist, but these 
intentions are measured long before the service member must actually make a 
reenlistment decision (Hosek & Martorell, 2009, p. 35). 
Hosek and Martorell show that the effect of deployment on Army reenlistment 
rates changed from positive to negative from 1996 to 2007. This could be due to two 
reasons: first, more soldiers had an accumulation of a large number of months deployed 
to hostile areas and the estimated effect of deployment decreased from positive to 
negative for soldiers with many months of hostile deployments (p. 70).  For both soldiers 
and Marines, a large total number of months deployed to areas eligible for HFP reduced 
reenlistment, especially in the later years of this study, and the effect was larger for 
soldiers (Hosek & Martorell, 2009, p. 70).   
The study, “How Deployments Affect Service Members” by Hosek et al. is a 
multidisciplinary analysis based on responses to the Status of Forces Surveys of Active 
Duty Personnel from March and July 2003 and focus groups. The study examines the 
relationship between deployment-related stress and intention to stay in the military 
(Hosek, Kavanagh, & Miller, p. xviii).   
The authors estimate linear probability models using the March and July 2003 
Status of Forces Surveys of Active Duty Personnel where the explanatory variables are 
meant to represent situations outside a service member’s control.  The omitted group7 is 
those with the following characteristics: worked a longer than normal duty-day from 0 to 
20 times, not away, not in OIF/OEF combat operations, time away was neither more nor 
less than expected, you feel neither well nor poorly trained, your unit is neither well nor 
poorly trained, E1–E4, not married, male, white only (Hosek, Kavanagh, & Miller, 2006, 
p. 61).   
                                                 
7 The omitted group is the group to which the reported results are referenced. 
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The authors’ regression analysis found that frequently working longer than the 
usual work day increased the probability of higher-than-usual stress and also decreased 
the probability of intention to remain in the military (Hosek, Kavanagh, & Miller, 2006, 
p. xix).  For the period covered by the survey, being in combat operations in OIF/OEF 
during the previous 12 months (mid-2002 to mid-2003) had no statistically significant 
effect on the intention to stay in the military, except for the Army.  Soldiers were less 
inclined to stay in the military if they served in combat operations as part of OIF/OEF 
during the previous 12 months (Hosek, Kavanagh, & Miller, 2006, p. 107).  It is 
important to consider here, that while these results seem to contradict previous literature, 
the reported results are intentions to stay in the military, not actual reenlistments.  Also of 
note is that the combat question was worded, “Were you involved in combat operations?” 
with no direction given to the survey respondent how to define “involved” or “combat” 
(Hosek, Kavanagh, & Miller, 2006, p. 62).  The authors further found that involvement in 
OIF or OEF combat operations did not affect the intention to remain in the military 
except for Army enlisted members (2006, p. 78).    
David Barber’s Naval Postgraduate School Master’s thesis, “Predicting the 
Effects of Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonuses in the Post-9/11 Era: Integrating 
the Effects of Deployment Tempo” examined the effects of deployment tempo on first-
term enlisted Marine Corps personnel using data obtained from the Marine Corps’ Total 
Force Data Warehouse8 (TFDW) who made reenlistment decisions between fiscal years 
2003 and 2007.  Barber categorized a deployment as one in support of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom or Enduring Freedom and grouped deployments, in 100-day increments, 
according to the total number of days deployed from FY03 to FY07.  Barber found that 
deployments in support of OIF or OEF had a negative and statistically significant effect 
on reenlistment; in particular, Marines deployed in support of OIF/OEF were between six 
and 29 percent less likely to reenlist than Marines who had never deployed in support of 
those two operations (p. 43).  While Barber found that any number of episodes deployed 
reduced a Marine’s reenlistment probability, Hosek and Martorell (2009) found that 
                                                 
8 TFDW data included demographic information as well as military rank, occupational specialty, and 
End of Active Service (EAS) date, and deployment information. 
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hostile deployment only had a negative effect for Marines with greater than 7 months or 
two episodes in the three years preceding their reenlistment decision in 2004 and 2005.   
These conflicting results could be partly due to how deployments were measured 
in each study.  Hosek and Martorell (2009) measured a hostile deployment as one where 
the service member received Hostile Fire Pay, whereas Barber’s measurement included 
only those who deployed in support of OIF/OEF.  Consequently, a service member could 
have been on a hostile deployment9 according to Hosek and Martorell’s definition but not 
according to Barber’s definition of a hostile deployment10.  If many service member had 
positive experiences in areas deemed hostile, that could have biased Hosek and 
Martorell’s hostile deployment effects results upwards.  If Barber’s definition of a hostile 
deployment (one in support of the Global War on Terror) is a more accurate measurement 
of hostility faced during deployment, then his results may be more accurate. 
D. MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAM REPORTS 
The U.S. Army Surgeon General chartered the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) in July 2003 in order to assess OIF-related 
mental health issues, and to provide recommendation to the OIF medical and line 
commands (U.S. Army, 2003, p. 5).  The MHAT data collection effort involved small 
group interviews and surveys with 756 Soldiers—82% of which had engaged in combat.  
While the purpose of the MHAT was to assess the OIF behavioral healthcare system and 
other mental health issues among OIF soldiers, the Team’s findings offer insight to the 
typical soldier’s11 experience in OIF. 
About 77% of soldiers reported to the MHAT that they experienced no or mild 
stress, emotional, or family problems.  Interestingly, 52% of soldiers report low or very 
low personal morale and 72% reported low or very low unit morale; unit cohesion was 
                                                 
9 See footnote 4, for areas that are eligible for HFP. 
10 For instance, deployment to Cuba would be considered a hostile deployment according to Hosek 
and Martorell (2009) but not according to Barber (2009). 
11 MHAT I through MHAT II examined only U.S. Army Soldiers deployed to or in direct support of 
combat operations in Iraq.  MHAT III and later studied U.S. Soldiers stationed in Kuwait and Qatar 
separately than those deployed to Iraq.  U.S. Marine personnel were included only during MHAT IV. 
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also reported to be very low  (U.S. Army, 2003, p. 12).  These findings point to low 
utility according to Hosek, Kavanagh, and Miller’s study (2006); if the soldiers updated 
their expected utility of future deployments based on these reported findings, OIF 
Soldiers could experience a lower reenlistment rate than other groups.  The most reported 
combat stressors included seeing dead bodies and human remains, being attacked, and 
personally knowing someone who was seriously injured or killed (U.S. Army, 2003, p. 
12).  
The team comprising MHAT-III traveled to Iraq from October to November 2005 
and was the third consecutive team to deploy in each of the previous three years; MHAT-
II12 having deployed to Kuwait and Iraq from August through October 2004.  The 
purpose of MHAT-III was the same as the two previous teams and served to note the 
attitudes and experiences of soldiers deployed in support of OIF 04-06 during this time13.  
Data were collected using Soldier Surveys and soldier focus groups as well as behavioral 
health care provider surveys and focus groups (U.S. Army, 2006, p. 5).   
The changing nature of deployments in Iraq was indicated in the soldiers’ reports 
to the Team.  While soldiers in OIF-I reported higher incidents of direct gunfire and 
soldiers in OIF-II reported receiving more enemy rocket or mortar attacks, soldiers in 
OIF 04-06 reported  lower exposure to rocket or mortar attacks.  Soldiers surveyed during 
MHAT-III were more likely than OIF-II soldier (interviewed during MHAT-II) to report 
knowing someone seriously injured or killed and having an IED or other ordinance 
explode near them (U.S. Army, 2006, p. 6).   Both soldiers deployed for the first time and 
soldiers deployed to Iraq on multiple deployments mentioned during focus group 
interviews that they perceived the enemy as more lethal and unpredictable than during 
OIF-I or OIF-II phases of operations given the rise in the use of IEDs.   
 
                                                 
12 MHAT-II used the “Soldier Survey” which was administered to 2,064 soldiers stationed at various 
bases throughout Kuwait and Iraq.  The data from this survey were compared to results from the same 
survey administered during August-October 2003 during MHAT I report.  MHAT-II supplemented their 
survey findings with focus groups. 
13 MHAT-III report did not include soldiers deployed exclusively to Kuwait. 
 14
The MHAT-IV report was conducted from August to October 2006 and included 
Marine Corps personnel for the first time14.  The purpose of this MHAT was the same as 
the previous three, the survey methods, and focus group methodology were also similar 
to the three previous teams’ work, though the survey included questions assessing 
battlefield ethics and combat leader behaviors for the first time (U.S. Army, 2006, p. 7). 
MHAT-IV focused assessment on soldiers serving in Brigade Combat Teams and 
Marines serving in Regimental Combat Teams but also included soldiers and Marines 
from support units as well.  The demographics of the sample from the previous MHATs 
were similar to MHAT-IV (U.S. Army, 2006, p. 10).  
The frequency of combat experiences was assessed by one of 30 different 
reported combat experiences using the Soldier and Marine Well-Being Survey.  Fewer 
MHAT-III respondents and MAHT-IV participants report receiving small arms fire than 
those interviewed during MHAT-I and smaller portions of respondents reported knowing 
someone seriously injured or killed than during previous MHATs.   
The fifth MHAT administered 2,279 anonymous surveys from September to 
October 2007 and conducted focus groups with soldiers in Iraq in October and November 
2007.  MHAT-V findings were published on February 14, 2008 and highlighted several 
central findings (U.S. Army, 2008, pp. 12–13): 
• The percentage of soldiers who reported high or very high unit morale was 
significantly higher in 2007 than 200615. 
• When the data is normalized for months deployed, soldiers reported a 
large decline in exposure to a variety of combat events when compared to 
2006—particularly for soldiers who had been in Iraq for six months or 
less. 
• Without adjustment, soldiers reported a high incidence of intense combat 
events; 72% of soldiers reported knowing someone seriously injured or 
killed. 
• Soldiers on multiple deployments report low morale, more mental health 
problems, and more stress-related work problems. 
                                                 
14 1,320 Soldiers and 447 Marines administered anonymous surveys (U.S. Army, 2006, 3). 
15 2006 values were gathered and reported in the MHAT-IV reports, the previous MHAT report 
completed immediately prior to this one. 
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Similar to MHAT-IV, MHAT-V authors assessed combat experience by 
measuring responses to 33 different combat experiences and creating a combat 
experience score ranging from zero to 33 by summing the results (U.S. Army, 2008, p. 
34).  Eleven of the 33 combat experiences measured by MHAT-V showed significant 
decline16 and none of the 33 measured combat experiences increased.  Of note, however, 
significant combat experiences still occurred to the soldier deployed during the time of 
this report; more than 78% of all respondents reported receiving enemy mortar or rocket 
fire and more respondents reported knowing someone seriously injured in killed in 2007 
than in 2006 (72.1% versus 65.9%) (U.S. Army, 2008, p. 36–37). 
E. PDHA SURVEYS AND REENLISTMENT/RETENTION BEHAVOIR 
The objectives of the study titled, “Mental Health Problems, Use of Mental Health 
Service, and Attrition for Military Service After Returning for Deployment to Iraq and 
Afghanistan,” were to examine: the relationship between combat deployments and the 
correlation between the screening results reported on the Post-Deployment Health 
Assessment (PDHA) (DD Form 2796)17; actual use of mental health services by the 
service member; and attrition from the military (p. 1023).  The authors conducted a 
descriptive study and expressed their results as functions of total person-years of follow-
up after deployment (p. 1024).  The study population consisted of 303, 905 soldiers and 
Marines who completed a PDHA between May 1, 2003 and April 30, 2004.  
One of the outcomes analyzed were attrition rates for members who completed a 
PDHA and who were considered a mental health risk compared with those who 
completed a deployment but were not considered a mental health risk.  A soldier or 
Marine was defined as a mental health risk for the purposes of this study if they screened 
 
                                                 
16 Those with a p-value equal to or less than .01; given the large sample size a p-value of .05 raises the 
possibility that some significant results would occur simply because of the high number of tests conducted. 
17 In April 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) mandated that all service members complete 
a PDHA within 30 days of return from deployment using Department of Defense Form 2796.  Department 
of Defense Instruction Number 6490.03 delineates Service roles and responsibilities for PDHA completion, 
storages, and other administrative actions. 
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positive for depression, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), or endorsed questions 
related to suicide, interpersonal relationship problems, or interest in receiving mental 
health care.   
A positive response to feeling down, depressed, or hopeless, or expressing little 
interest or pleasure in doing things (DD Form 2796, Question 11), indicated that a service 
member was considered at risk for depression and subsequently a mental health risk.  A 
positive endorsement of any two of the four questions which asks service members about 
their experiencing trauma, numbing, situation avoidance, or hyper-arousal categorized 
them as at risk for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and consequently a mental 
health risk (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006, p. 1025).  A service member was also 
considered to be at risk for developing mental health problems if they endorsed a 
response to suicide ideations (DD Form 2796, Question 11), or expressed “interest in 
receiving help for stress, emotional, alcohol, or family problems” (DD Form 2796, 
Question 10).  A positive response to PDHA Question 13, “having thoughts or concerns 
you might have serious conflicts with your spouse, family members, or close friend or 
you might hurt or lose control with someone?” were the final criteria set for inclusion in 
to the mental health risk category (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006, p. 1025).    
Overall, 19.1% of soldiers or Marines returning from Iraq were considered mental 
health concerns, 11.3% of those returning from Afghanistan screened positive for mental 
health concerns, and 8.5% of those deployed elsewhere met the risk criteria for mental 
health concerns (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006, p. 1025).  Those deployed to 
OIF,18 were more likely than those deployed elsewhere to report witnessing wounded or 
killed Americans, discharging their weapon, or feeling in great danger of being killed, 
while on their most recent deployment; 46 percent of soldiers or Marines returning from 
OEF reported any combat experience, while 65 percent of those returning from Iraq 
reported any combat experience (p. 1027). 
The authors found that those service members who were categorized as mental 
health risks, were more likely to leave the military for any reason during the year 
                                                 
18 Those deployed to Iraq, Kuwait, or Qatar. 
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immediately following their return from deployment, than those who were not 
categorized as mental health risks (p. 1028) and that soldiers and Marines deployed in 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom were more likely to leave military service during the 
year long follow-up period than were those deployed to Afghanistan or other locations (p. 
1029). 
The authors do not directly analyze the relationship between combat exposure and 
attrition from military service, however, they do find that exposure to combat situations 
during the deployment for which the PDHA is completed is correlated with screening 
positive for PTSD (a metal health risk) among Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) veterans.  
79.6% of OIF veterans who screened positive for PTSD reported witnessing seeing 
people wounded or killed or discharging their weapon in direct combat with the enemy 
(Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006, p. 1028).  Overall, those returning from Iraq 
were more likely to have experienced combat, were more likely to screen positive for 
mental health concerns and PTSD, and were more likely to leave the military for any 
reason during the yearlong follow-up period after their most recent deployment. 
While this study showed that mental health concerns on the PDHA were 
correlated with attrition from the military in the year following deployment it did not 
directly study the direct effect of combat exposure on attrition.  Additionally, while valid 
in other literature the authors point out that their measures of attrition include both 
voluntary separation, such as expiration of active service, and involuntary separation (p. 
1031).  Finally, there were demographic differences in deployment locals as more 
Marines and active duty units deployed to OIF than other locations and those who 
deployed but did not have a PDHA on record were more likely to be Marines (p. 1027). 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a review of the current literature regarding the 
relationship between deployment and combat exposure to intended and actual 
reenlistment behavior.  Several conclusions can be made from this review. 
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• Service members who had some months of hostile duty were more likely 
to reenlist than those without hostile duty.  However, as the number of 
hostile months increased, the probability of reenlisting decreased and the 
decrease occurred more rapidly for hostile months than for non-hostile 
months.   
• Status of Forces Surveys of Active Duty Personnel administered between 
2002 and 2005 show that hostile deployments have a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of intention to 
reenlist.   
• Service in OIF or OEF did not statistically affect member’s intention to 
stay on active duty except for Army personnel where service in either of 
the two operations had a negative effect on intention to stay on active 
duty.   
• According to Mental Health Advisory Team reports conducted annually 
since 2003. fewer OIF participants report receiving small arms fire in 2005 
and 2006 than those involved in OIF-I during 2003.  Later participants in 
OIF reported seeing dead or seriously injured American less often but 
more often reported exposure to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or 
booby traps. 
• Soldiers and Marines deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
were more likely to experience combat, screen positive for mental health 
concerns and PTSD, and to leave the military during the yearlong follow 
up period than were those deployed to other locations. 
• Differing definitions of hostile deployments and the changing nature of 
violence and conditions faced by service members during deployments 
lead to seemingly contradictory deployment effects on reenlistment.  
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III. DATA DESCRIPTION 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the various sources of the datasets 
used for this study.  Section A identifies the different agencies and the data files they 
respectively provided as well as provides a brief description concerning how the two 
datasets where merged.  Section B summarizes the highlights of the chapter.    
A. DATA SOURCES 
The data for this thesis comes from both DMDC (Defense Manpower Data 
Center) and the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC19). The data from 
DMDC are quarterly personnel files for all service enlisted members between 1994 and 
2007, regardless of their deployment status.  The data from AFHSC contains responses to 
the post-deployment health assessment survey (PDHA) between 2002 and 2007. The 
AFHSC merged the active duty personnel file20 using service members’ social security 
numbers and their respective PDHAs responses contained in the AFSHC file.  Both data 
files were cleansed of all personally identifiable data before the final analytic file was 
transferred from the AFHSC to the Naval Postgraduate School; unique study 
identification numbers were assigned to each observation in order to protect individual 
privacy and provide anonymity21.    
1. The Active Duty Personnel Extract File 
The Active Duty Enlisted Master File, collected by the DMDC on a quarterly 
basis, contained information about service members from the third quarter of calendar 
year 1994 through the end of calendar year 2007.  This enlisted master file provides 
demographic data such as age, race, gender, pay grade, marital status, months in service, 
and number of dependents, as well as military specific information such as contract 
                                                 
19 The AFHSC is formerly known as Army Medical Surveillance Activity (AMSA). 
20 The active duty personnel extract file was originally provided to NPS from the DMDC in 2008 for 
another thesis.  Since that time, the active duty file was stored by NPS on a secure server. 
21 The use of data and methodology for this study was approved by the NPS Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) and AFHSC prior to accessing or transmitting the Active Duty Personnel File to the AFHSC. 
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length, occupational specialty, and the service member’s unit22.  The enlisted master file 
was augmented with waiver data that included Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) 
scores, education level, accession date, and home of record information.  Finally, the 
enlisted master file was augmented with information from separation files, which 
included Interservice Separation Codes (ISC) that record the date and reason for 
separation or the occurrence of a reenlistment.  
2. DD Form 2796 Post-Deployment Health Assessments 
The purpose of the Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) (DD Form 
2796) is to assess a returning service member’s health after deployment and to assist 
healthcare providers23 identify those in need of present or future medical care.  First 
developed and distributed in April 2003, DD Form 2796 is required for all deployments 
outside the United States (OCONUS) that last more than 30 days. This form is 
recommended but at the discretion of the Component Commander, Service Component 
Commander, or commander exercising operation control during all deployments less than 
or equal to 30 days, deployments with a fixed military treatment facility (MTF) or for 
deployments within the Continental United States (CONUS) 24.  Those required to 
complete a PDHA must do so no sooner than 30 days before re-deployment to no later 
than 30 days after returning to their home station.  Following the self-administered 
portion of the PDHA, a trained health care provider25 conducts a one-on-one meeting 
with the member to discuss health related concerns and to screen the service member for 
physical or mental health concerns.  Mental health is assessed using several questions: 
two questions widely used in primary care setting measure depression; a four-item screen 
for PTSD developed for the National Center of PTSD; finally four questions that relate to 
                                                 
22 Service member’s unit is recorded as a Unit Identification Code (UIC). 
23 DoD Instruction 6490.03 defines a health care provider as a nurse, medical technician, corpsman, or 
medic. 
24 DoD Instruction 6490.03 provides full instructive and administrative guidance for the 
administration and control of deployment health and administration of the PDHA. 
25 DoD Instruction 6490.03 defines a trained health care provider as a physician, physician assistant, 
advanced nurse practitioner, nurse practitioner, independent duty corpsman, independent duty medical 
technician, or Special Forces medical sergeant. 
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suicide, interpersonal relations, and interest in receiving care (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & 
Milliken, 2006, pp. 1024–1025).  Positive responses to particular PDHA questions 
require referrals for further medical evaluations.  The health care providers document 
these referrals and discuss with the service member the resources available that best meet 
his/her needs.  The PDHA also requires service members to annotate their branch and 
component of service, operation location, and occupational specialty while deployed.   
Central to this study, the PDHA also asks service members about specific 
experiences during the deployment in question.  In particular, the PDHA assesses the 
service member’s battlefield experiences as it requires service members to respond to 
whether they felt in great danger of being killed, whether they witnessed injured or dead 
personnel, whether the fired their weapon at the enemy, and whether they were inside or 
closely inspected destroyed military vehicles during deployment.  While these responses 
are not, and realistically cannot be verified, they do serve as a proxy for experiences that 
service members may have had during deployments that may influence future 
reenlistment and retention behavior.  Details of the combat exposure information are 
described in Chapter IV. 
3. Sample Criteria for the Study Population 
The final dataset for this analysis represents pooled cross-sectional data of 
enlisted first-term service members in the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and 
Air Force who began their first enlistment contract during calendar years 2002, 2003, or 
2004.  The sample was restricted to only those who initially enlisted utilizing four year 
contracts (three and four year contracts in Army).  In order to ensure that only those 
members serving their first enlistment contract were included in the sample, the final 
dataset was further restricted to four year enlistees who served less than 52 months of 
service (40 months of service for three-year enlistees).  Selecting 52 and 40 months of 
service prevented members who extended their enlistment contracts for short periods of 
time but had no intention of reenlisting from being dropped from the sample.  Previous 
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literature26 has found significantly different attrition rates between service members in 
their first term of service and service members in subsequent terms of service; this study 
focuses only on first-term enlisted service members.  Restricting the final dataset to 
cohort years 2002–2004 allow the PDHA records to encompass the entirety of each 
service member’s initial contract obligation thereby recording deployment history during 
the first term.  The final data set includes 179,651 total observations; 74,833 Army 
personnel, 41,607 Marine personnel, 40,938 Navy personnel, and 22,775 Air Force 
personnel. 
B. SUMMARY 
In summary, the Active Duty Personnel Extract File constructed by the DMDC 
and the Post-deployment Health Assessment questionnaire (DD Form 2796) provided by 
the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center were merged using a social security 
numbers.  The linked data contains demographic information, service members’ military 
service information, and responses to PDHA.  The AFHSC merged the two datasets and 
removed personally identifiable information prior to the final datasets delivery to the NPS 




                                                 
26 Hosek and Martorell find that second term service members have consistently higher reenlistment 
rates than their first term counterparts (2009, 11). 
 23
IV. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION  
Section A discusses the dependent variables and Section B discusses the key 
independent variables and control variables used in analyzing the separation and attrition 
behavior of those in the sample.  Section C provides a summary of the control and 
dependent variables used in this study. 
A. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1. Staying Past Initial Obligation 
The first dependent variable of interest is if an enlisted member stays past their 
initial obligation: a binary dummy variable takes on a value of one if the member does 
continue past initial obligation; and 0 otherwise.  For the purposes of this study, whether 
a person stays past initial obligation is determined if either of the two conditions below is 
met.  First, it occurs when a service member’s month in service is greater than their initial 
enlistment term dictated.  For example, those with a four year enlistment contract who 
have greater than 48 months in service are considered to have stayed past their initial 
obligation.  Likewise, for three-year enlistees, having greater than 36 months in service is 
also categorized as staying past initial enlistment obligation.  In the analysis, we assume 
most Army enlisted faced a three-year initial contract and other services faced a four-year 
initial contract.  Second, Interservice Separation Codes27 (ISC) are also used to identify 
whether a service member stays past their initial obligation.  There are several instances 
in which service members signaled their willingness to continue their military service and 
is captured by an ISC even when their months in service was less than their contractual 
obligation.  Service members are categorized as staying past their initial obligation if they 
have an ISC corresponding to “immediate reenlistment” or if they are assigned an ISC for 
participation in an officer commissioning program, assignment to a military service 
academy, or for a warrant officer program.  Participation in an officer program signifies a 
 
                                                 
27 These ISCs are standardized codes that the DMDC created using each service’s Separation Program 
Designator (SPD). 
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member’s willingness to remain in military service and entails additional years of 
obligated military service as a requisite for program participation.  
2. Early Attrition (Non-EAS Separation) 
A service member is considered to have non-EAS separation if the member did 
not complete their service contract for reasons other than accepting a commission, 
retirement, or death. Appendix A lists all the ISC codes that represent non-EAS attrition. 
A binary variable takes the value of one if a service member’s ISC code falls into this 
category, and 0 otherwise. 
B. KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1. Deployment Indicator 
For those that were not deployed during the study period, they would not have a 
matching PDHA response from AFHSC.  A deployment indicator takes the value of one 
if the service member has been deployed and consequently completed a PDHA form, and 
0 otherwise.  The inclusion of this indicator tests whether there is a difference in retention 
or attrition outcomes between those who deployed and those who did not. 
2. Deployment Locations 
The deployment variables are generated according to each service member’s 
PDHA responses. Deployment locations are characterized as Iraq, Afghanistan, other 
locations, or none. The PDHA form allows the respondent to list up to five countries and 
time at each location where they were mainly deployed. If the service member includes 
Iraq in the areas they were mainly deployed, it is treated as deployment to Iraq.  If the 
service member included Afghanistan as the area they were mainly deployed the 
deployment is treated as a deployment to Afghanistan.  If the PDHA respondent did not 
list Iraq or Afghanistan as a deployment location, the deployment is categorized as a 




If the service member has not completed a PDHA survey, they are considered to 
have not deployed during their initial enlistment contract.  Chapter III provides details 
concerning the requirements for PDHA completion, and DoD Instruction 6490.03 
provides detailed guidance concerning administrative requirements and responsibilities 
for PDHA completion and recording requirements.  Those who deployed inside the 
Continental United States, were deployed less than 31 days, or were deployed OCONUS 
to locales with permanent medical treatment facilities may be erroneously categorized as 
not being deployed if the appropriate authority decided not to require the completion of 
the PDHA.  Previous literature has found non-hostile deployments, which are most likely 
not to require PDHA, do not significantly influence reenlistment behavior (Hosek, 
Kavanagh, & Miller, 2006, p. xix).    
3. Combat Exposure 
The PDHA asks service members to respond to questions regarding their combat 
experiences during their deployment. These questions ask whether a respondent felt in 
great danger of being killed, whether they saw dead, wounded or seriously wounded 
coalition forces, enemy combatants, or civilian personnel during their deployment.  The 
PDHA also prompts respondents to answer whether they fired their weapon28 while in 
direct combat with the enemy or whether they were inside, entered, or closely inspected 
destroyed military vehicles.  This study examines the following combat exposure: 
a. Weapons Usage  
• A binary indicator capturing whether a service member ever fired their 
weapon during their deployment (regardless of firing location) 
• Three binary indicators capturing whether a service member fired the 
weapon from land, sea, or air.  Firing a weapon from an aircraft, for 
example, might have a different psychological effect on the service 
member than if the weapon was fired while on foot or from a ground-
based vehicle. 
                                                 
28 If the respondent answered yes, then whether on land, sea, or air also needs to be selected. 
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b. Casualty Experience 
• A binary indicator capturing whether a service member ever reported 
seeing an individual (regardless of whether the individual was a 
coalition member, enemy combatant, or civilian) killed, wounded, or 
dead during any deployment during their enlistment.   
• Three binary indicators capturing whether a service member witness 
an individual being killed, wounded, or dead from the following sub 
population: coalition member, enemy combatant, or civilian. 
Witnessing death of an enemy combatant can very well have a 
different psychological effect on the service member (and his 
subsequent stay decision) than if the death is of a coalition member. 
• In order to measure a service member’s exposure to destroyed military 
vehicles a final combat exposure binary variable captures whether the 
service member reported being inside, enter, or closely inspect any 
destroyed military vehicles during any deployment.  If the service 
member ever reported that occurrence during any deployment the 
variable takes on a value of one; otherwise it is assigned a value of 0.  
C. CONTROL VARIABLES 
1. Cohort Years 
There are two dummy variables that account for the calendar year in which a 
service member entered the military.  These dummy variables are used to control to 
unobservable characteristics of a calendar year which are experienced by all members of 
the cohort such as macro-economic trends and military policies that affect all members of 
the U.S. military during a given time period.   
2. Military Occupational Specialties 
The PDHA collects information pertaining to a service member’s occupational 
specialty during the deployment and combat specialty.  These responses are an accurate 
reflection of the duties performed by each service member during their deployment.  
However, these measures are wide-ranging and subjective since they are self-reported; 
service members may have different definitions of job titles and job descriptions than 
either their fellow service members or those at DMDC.  Therefore, occupational 
specialties used for this study were obtained using the Enlisted Personnel File provided 
by the DMDC; these occupational specialties are far less subjective and reflect the duties 
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that each service member was trained to perform during their enlistment.  Occupations 
are categorized according to a Department of Defense (DoD) Occupational Group29 
where similar specialties regardless of service branch are grouped together.  For example, 
DoD Occupational Group 10 titled, “Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists” 
contains those whose military specialty include infantrymen, engineers, air crewmen, 
seamen, and those who perform installation security.  For this study, these DoD 
occupational groups were further categorized into five distinct categories according to the 
roles performed by the occupational group members.  The five occupational groups are 
combat arms, medical service, combat service, service support, and other occupations.  
The omitted category is “other occupations,” which includes those in recruit training or in 
a training status.  If a member belongs to one of these groups, a value of one was 
assigned; otherwise, a value of 0 was assigned. 
3. Race/Ethnicity 
Binary variables created from the DMDC data categorized service members into 
the following mutually exclusive groups: white, black, Hispanic, other races, and 
unknown.  If the service member belongs to one of these groups, a value of one is 
assigned; otherwise, a value of 0 is assigned.  The omitted category is white. 
4. Marital Status  
Marital status is divided into five groups: never married, married with no 
dependents (no children), married with dependents (children), divorced, and single with 
dependents.  A service member’s marital status was measured at the end of their active 
duty service regardless of their separation cause.  If the service member belongs to one of 
these groups, a value of one is assigned; otherwise a value of 0 is assigned.  The omitted 
category is single with no dependents.  
 
                                                 
29 DoD Instruction 1312.1-1 Occupational Conversion Index provides the tables that convert similar 
occupations in different branch of Services in to a single group. 
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5. Education 
Educational status is measured at the time of a service member’s first enlistment 
and is categorized into five groups: less than high school degree, high school degree or 
GED, some college education but no bachelor degree (these include associate degrees), a 
bachelor degree, and lastly more than a bachelor degree.  The reference group is those 
with less than high school education. 
6. AFQT Score 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores are used to determine an 
applicant’s eligibility for military service and are derived from the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).  An AFQT score is a combination of four 
subtests that measure general cognitive ability, and is composed of verbal and 
mathematic subtests.  AFQT scores are reported as percentiles, which correspond to 
AFQT categories.  An AFQT percentile score of 93–99 falls into category I, a percentile 
score between 65–92 falls into category II, percentile scores of 50–64 fall in category 
IIIA, 31–49 fall within category IIIB, percentile scores of 10–30 fall within category IV, 
and percentile scores lower than 9 fall within AFQT category V30.  Binary variables for 
AFQT categories take on a value of one if the service member’s percentile score dictates 
their inclusion in that category; otherwise, a value of 0 is assigned.  The omitted category 
is AFQT category IIIA, those with a percentile score between 50 and 64. 
D. SUMMARY 
To summarize, this study will analyze three dependent variables: whether a 
service member stays past initial obligation, whether a service member completes his or 
her initial obligation and separated afterward (expiration of service obligation 
separation), and whether a person is subjected to attrition before their contract expires 
(early, Non-EAS attrition). The key variables for the models are the combat exposure 
information reported in the PDHA.  There are two types of control variables in the model.  
                                                 
30 Those in category V are ineligible to enlist and those in category IV may not exceed 20% of the 
total number of persons enlisted (DoD Instruction 1304.26, 2005).  
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The first type captures the general deployment characteristics (location, duration, 
frequency.  The rest of the control variables include the following demographic and 
service information: rank, occupation, race, marital status, education. Chapter V will 
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V. STATISTICAL MODEL 
This chapter identifies the statistical model used in the study.  Section A defines 
the analytical model.  Section B describes the multivariate probit regression models used 
in this thesis. 
A. ANALYTICAL METHOD 
This study uses probit models.  Probit models are nonlinear regression models 
designed for use with binary dependent variables that are bound between zero and one 
and require maximum likelihood estimation.  The maximum likelihood estimation is 
based on the distribution of the dependent variables given the explanatory variables.  
Unlike linear models where the predicted probabilities can either exceed one or drop 
below zero, the conditional probabilities of probit models always fall between the bounds 
of zero and one.  In this study, each dependent variable is binary and takes on a value of 
either one or zero.  The theoretical model is: 
Pr(Y=1|X) = Φ (X’β) 
where 
 Y = the probability that the dependent variable is one 
 Φ = Cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
 X = Vector explanatory variables which are assumed to influence the 
dependent variable 
 β = Coefficient of the regression estimated by maximum likelihood 
B. MULTIVARIATE PROBIT REGRESSION MODELS 
In this study, four sets of models are used to analyze the effect of combat 
exposure on first term enlisted service members’ retention and attrition and a set of 
models are re-estimated for sensitivity analysis.  Separate models are estimated for each 
of the two dependent variables and for each branch of service.  The models that measure 
retention probability only examine service members who have completed all but one year 
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of their obligated service; this technique allows us to focus on those who are eligible to 
make a retention decision.  Each of the models includes many of the same control 
variables that remain constant in each of the models such as: gender, race, military 
occupation, year of military entry, marital status, age, education, and AFQT score.  Only 
the key explanatory variables change in each model specification.  The general form of 
the model is: 
Pr(stay past initial obligation or Non-EAS separation) = β0 + β1(key 
independent variables) + β2(constant control variables) 
Finally, the model that measures service member retention is re-estimated with 
pay grade and deployment tempo variables included in order conduct a sensitivity 
analysis of the models. 
1. Model One  
Model One focuses on the overall effect of three combat exposure measures on 
retention or early attrition, regardless of where the combat exposure took place.  This 
Model takes the following general form: 
Pr(stay past initial obligation or Non-EAS separation) = β0 + β1(saw any 
individual killed, wounded, or dead) + β2(fired a weapon) + β3(entered, 
inside, or inspected destroyed military vehicle) + β4(deployed to other 
location) + β5(deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan) + β6(other explanatory 
variables) 
The key coefficients of interest are β1– β3, as they capture the effect of the three 
major combat exposure measures on reenlistment or attrition.  In addition, variables that 
control for deployment location (deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, deployed to other 
locations) are included so the model can separate the effect of deployment location from 
the effect of combat exposure on retention and early attrition.  The other explanatory 
variables that control for service members’ demographic and service characteristics 
remain unchanged for all models.  These explanatory variables are described in Section C 
of Chapter IV. 
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2. Model Two  
Model Two expands from Model One by including finer details of combat 
exposure.  In particular, there are seven key variables of interest:  the first set of variables 
captures whether a service member discharged a weapon from the land, air, or sea during 
deployment; the second set of variables capture whether a service member saw coalition 
members, enemy, or civilians killed, wounded, or dead during deployment; lastly whether 
a service member was inside or inspected destroyed military vehicles.  Like Model One, 
this model controls for deployments locations and the rest of the variables are identical to 
that of Model One. 
3. Model Three   
Model Three focuses on combat exposure that occurred only in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  The key variables of interest in this model are the following: seeing any 
individual killed in Iraq or Afghanistan, firing any weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan, and 
ever entering, being inside, or inspecting destroyed military vehicles in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  This model is useful for comparing the effects of combat exposure that 
occur only in Iraq or Afghanistan with the effects of combat exposure that occur during 
any deployment as examined in Model One. 
4. Model Four  
Model Four builds upon Model One by examining whether combat exposure that 
occurred in Iraq or Afghanistan has a differential effect on reenlistment and attrition rates 
than combat exposures that occur in other locations.  In other words, this model examines 
whether combat exposure that occurred in Iraq or Afghanistan affects retention or 
attrition rates differently than the same type of combat exposure that occurred in other 
OIF/OEF locations.  Model Four combines combat exposure occurring in Afghanistan 
and Iraq as one group, so it is easier to get more precise estimates of the effect (since 
sample size is particularly small for deployment to Afghanistan).  In addition to the three 
combat exposure variables from Model One, this model adds three additional key 
variables: seeing any individual killed in Iraq or Afghanistan, firing any weapon in Iraq 
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or Afghanistan, and ever entering, being inside, or inspecting destroyed military vehicles 
in Iraq or Afghanistan.  The rest of the model specification is identical to that of Model 
One.  If the three additional combat exposure variables are statistically significant, then 
there is evidence that combat exposures occurring in Iraq or Afghanistan affect service 
members’ reenlistment decision differently than combat exposures occurring elsewhere. 
5. Sensitivity Analysis Models  
Models One through Four are individually re-estimated with pay grade dummy 
variables and with variables that measure deployment tempo included in the set of 
constant explanatory variables in order to test the sensitivity of the models.  Pay grade 
and deployment tempo variables are not included in the main analysis because such 
information is highly correlated with the dependent variable.   
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Four separate models are used to examine the effects of combat exposure on 
retention and attrition of first-term enlisted service members.  While the control variables 
remain unchanged, each of the models uses different key explanatory variables to 
measure the degrees to which the location or type of combat exposure affect retention and 
attrition amongst first-term enlisted service members.  A comparison of these models 
allows one to examine the effect that combat exposure has on retention and attrition, 
while controlling for the effects of deployment tempo and deployment location.  Finally, 
for the analysis that examines reenlistment decision, each of the models are re-estimated 
with pay grade dummy variables included in the model specification. 
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VI. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This chapter presents summary statistics used in providing the interpretation for 
reenlistment and Non-EAS separation analysis of the service members included in the 
sample.  Section A compares the descriptive statistics of those who have been deployed 
and those who have not been deployed during their initial enlistment contract.   
A. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS  
1. Demographic and Service Characteristics 
Table 1 provides the statistical sample for first-term enlisted service members 
who did and did not deploy during their initial enlistment contract.   
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Table 1.  Service and Demographic Characteristics 
  Army Marine Navy Air Force 
Race/Ethnicity Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
White 0.258  0.249  0.298  0.322  0.254  0.246  0.303  0.355  
  (0.438) (0.432) (0.457) (0.467) (0.436) (0.431) (0.460) (0.479) 
Black 0.064  0.073  0.031  0.044  0.106  0.076  0.051  0.083  
  (0.244) (0.261) (0.173) (0.205) (0.308) (0.265) (0.220) (0.275) 
Other 0.037  0.028  0.027  0.023  0.043  0.037  0.024  0.025  
  (0.188) (0.166) (0.161) (0.151) (0.203) (0.188) (0.153) (0.155) 
Unknown 0.542  0.561  0.539  0.524  0.523  0.594  0.590  0.501  
  (0.498) (0.496) (0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.491) (0.492) (0.500) 
Hispanic 0.100  0.089  0.106  0.086  0.074  0.047  0.032  0.037  
  (0.300) (0.285) (0.307) (0.281) (0.261) (0.212) (0.175) (0.189) 
Gender/Age 
Female 0.119  0.251  0.033  0.107  0.125  0.175  0.220  0.330  
  (0.324) (0.434) (0.178) (0.310) (0.331) (0.380) (0.414) (0.470) 
Age 21.0  21.1  19.6  19.6  20.3  20.3  20.2  20.5  
  (3.2) (3.5) (1.8) (2.0) (2.6) (2.8) (2.1) (2.5) 
Education Level  
Non High School Diploma  0.003  0.004  0.011  0.009  0.020  0.024  0.001  0.002  
or GED Grad (0.056) (0.062) (0.103) (0.094) (0.139) (0.154) (0.037) (0.041) 
High School Diploma or GED 0.906  0.864  0.962  0.960  0.921  0.902  0.873  0.815  
  (0.292) (0.343) (0.192) (0.196) (0.270) (0.297) (0.333) (0.389) 
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  Army Marine Navy Air Force 
 Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Some college, no bachelor degree 0.040  0.043  0.012  0.013  0.039  0.048  0.015  0.014  
  (0.195) (0.202) (0.106) (0.113) (0.194) (0.213) (0.120) (0.115) 
Bachelors degree 0.032  0.039  0.004  0.005  0.012  0.015  0.017  0.018  
  (0.177) (0.193) (0.065) (0.073) (0.107) (0.123) (0.130) (0.134) 
Postgraduate degree 0.019  0.051  0.010  0.011  0.008  0.010  0.091  0.148  
  (0.136) (0.221) (0.100) (0.102) (0.091) (0.101) (0.288) (0.355) 
AFQT Score          
AFQT score >=93 0.047  0.041  0.035  0.034  0.020  0.050  0.064  0.123  
  (0.211) (0.199) (0.184) (0.180) (0.140) (0.218) (0.245) (0.328) 
AFQT score 65-92 0.316  0.288  0.319  0.326  0.242  0.330  0.403  0.380  
  (0.465) (0.453) (0.466) (0.469) (0.428) (0.470) (0.491) (0.485) 
AFQT score 50-64 0.274  0.281  0.270  0.284  0.252  0.267  0.250  0.245  
  (0.446) (0.450) (0.444) (0.451) (0.434) (0.443) (0.433) (0.430) 
AFQT score 31-49 0.339  0.368  0.356  0.331  0.476  0.345  0.280  0.212  
  (0.473) (0.482) (0.479) (0.471) (0.499) (0.475) (0.449) (0.409) 
AFQT score 10-30 0.020  0.017  0.006  0.005  0.002  0.001  0.003  0.001  
  (0.139) (0.129) (0.075) (0.071) (0.040) (0.022) (0.050) (0.038) 
Marital Status 
Single/Divorced 0.542  0.648  0.576  0.676  0.519  0.637  0.621  0.649  
  (0.498) (0.478) (0.494) (0.468) (0.500) (0.481) (0.485) (0.477) 
Single with Dependents 0.136  0.090  0.028  0.029  0.065  0.055  0.049  0.039  
  (0.342) (0.286) (0.163) (0.167) (0.246) (0.227) (0.215) (0.193) 
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  Army Marine Navy Air Force 
 Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Married 0.164  0.143  0.281  0.199  0.266  0.195  0.224  0.210  
  (0.370) (0.350) (0.450) (0.399) (0.442) (0.396) (0.417) (0.407) 
Married with non- 0.159  0.120  0.115  0.097  0.150  0.114  0.106  0.103  
spousal dependents (0.365) (0.325) (0.319) (0.295) (0.357) (0.317) (0.308) (0.304) 
Entered military while single 0.868  0.823  0.978  0.971  0.916  0.916  0.944  0.914  
  (0.339) (0.382) (0.147) (0.168) (0.278) (0.277) (0.230) (0.280) 
Entered military single  0.033  0.038  0.003  0.004  0.035  0.031  0.001  0.001  
with dependents (0.179) (0.191) (0.058) (0.065) (0.185) (0.174) (0.025) (0.026) 
Entered military while married 0.053  0.079  0.014  0.019  0.026  0.029  0.050  0.075  
  (0.224) (0.270) (0.117) (0.137) (0.159) (0.169) (0.219) (0.264) 
Entered military married  0.047  0.060  0.005  0.006  0.023  0.023  0.005  0.010  
with dependents (0.211) (0.238) (0.071) (0.076) (0.150) (0.150) (0.069) (0.098) 
Service Information 
Pay grade E1-E2 0.066  0.295  0.047  0.255  0.101  0.235  0.029  0.192  
  (0.248) (0.456) (0.212) (0.436) (0.301) (0.424) (0.167) (0.394) 
Pay grade E3 0.117  0.168  0.237  0.194  0.369  0.280  0.128  0.241  
  (0.321) (0.374) (0.425) (0.395) (0.483) (0.449) (0.334) (0.427) 
Pay grade E4 0.659  0.225  0.579  0.322  0.433  0.277  0.833  0.402  
  (0.474) (0.418) (0.494) (0.467) (0.496) (0.448) (0.373) (0.490) 
Pay grade E5 and higher 0.158  0.043  0.136  0.075  0.098  0.093  0.011  0.017  
  (0.365) (0.203) (0.343) (0.264) (0.297) (0.291) (0.106) (0.130) 
Months of service 38.0  17.2  44.7  28.6  41.3  28.9  44.6  28.6  
  (8.1) (15.5) (5.2) (19.1) (9.7) (17.9) (6.1) (18.0) 
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  Army Marine Navy Air Force 
 Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Year of Entry 
2002 Cohort 0.391  0.384  0.419  0.449  0.474  0.404  0.417  0.509  
  (0.488) (0.486) (0.494) (0.497) (0.499) (0.491) (0.493) (0.500) 
2003 Cohort 0.386  0.387  0.581  0.551  0.526  0.596  0.583  0.491  
  (0.487) (0.487) (0.494) (0.497) (0.499) (0.491) (0.493) (0.500) 
2004 Cohort 0.224  0.229  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
  (0.417) (0.421) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
MOS 
Combat Arms 0.374  0.216  0.480  0.173  0.155  0.098  0.183  0.070  
  (0.484) (0.412) (0.500) (0.378) (0.362) (0.298) (0.387) (0.255) 
Medical Service 0.051  0.056  0.000  0.000  0.043  0.043  0.051  0.101  
  (0.221) (0.230) 0.000  0.000  (0.203) (0.203) (0.220) (0.302) 
Combat Service 0.247  0.162  0.194  0.140  0.462  0.324  0.282  0.229  
  (0.431) (0.369) (0.396) (0.347) (0.499) (0.468) (0.450) (0.420) 
Service Support 0.298  0.254  0.307  0.339  0.275  0.252  0.367  0.261  
  (0.457) (0.435) (0.461) (0.473) (0.447) (0.434) (0.482) (0.439) 
Other Occupation 0.003  0.014  0.006  0.174  0.059  0.163  0.003  0.113  
  (0.050) (0.116) (0.076) (0.379) (0.235) (0.369) (0.051) (0.317) 
Observations 30577 44256 21303 20304 9486 31452 6486 16289 
Standard deviations in parentheses                 
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Table 1 provides comparative summary characteristics of all service members in 
the sample according to their service affiliation and whether or not they have a 
deployment history (i.e., the control group are those that did not have any matching 
PDHA).  Overall, whites comprised the largest known race regardless of service 
affiliation or deployment history.  Across each of the services, female members make up 
a larger portion of those without deployment history than those with a deployment 
history.  The Marine Corps has the lowest average age of new enlistees at less than 20 
years of age for both Marines who have deployed and those who have not.   
High school diploma graduates make up the largest educational category in each 
of the services while the Air Force has a much higher portion of its enlisted members 
holding a postgraduate degree than the other services; 14.8% of Air Force personnel who 
have not deployed posses a postgraduate degree and 9% of Air Force personnel who have 
deployed have a postgraduate degree.  The Air force also has a larger portion of its force 
with an AFQT score of 65 or above than the other services. 
Most members of the Marine Corps are single with no dependents upon military 
entry (97%) while the Army and Air Force has equally sized portion of their respective 
forces enter the military while married (5% who deployed and about 7% of those who did 
not deploy).  While 97% of new entrants to the Marine Corps were single with no 
dependents, only 58% of Marines who had deployed and 68% of Marines who had not 
deployed were single at the time of their separation or reenlistment decision.  Likewise, 
62% of airmen who have deployed and 64.9% of airmen who have not deployed were 
single with no deployments at the end of their initial obligation compared to over 90% of 
airmen who were single when they began their service.  Compared to the others, the 
Army has the largest percentage of its force that enters the military either married without 
non-spousal dependents or married with dependents.  The Army also has the highest 
percentage of its personnel who end their service while married with dependents: at the 
end of initial obligation, 15.9% of Army personnel who have deployed and 11.9% of 
those who have not deployed were married with dependents. 
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The Army and Marine Corps have the highest number of service members in a 
combat arms occupation amongst the four services with 37.4% and 48% respectively.  
The Navy and Air Force has a larger portion of those in Combat Service and Service 
Support occupations who have deployed than the Army or Marine Corps. 
2. Deployment and Combat Exposure Characteristics 
Table 2 provides the portion of each service that has been deployed during their 
initial enlistment contract as well as provides summary statistics of deployment history 
and combat exposure characteristics for service members who have been deployed at 
least once during their first enlistment contract.  
Table 2.  Deployment and Combat Exposure Characteristics 
  Army Marine Navy 
Air  
Force 
Has been deployed 0.409  0.512  0.232  0.285  
  (0.492) (0.500) (0.422) (0.451) 
Has NOT been deployed 0.591  0.488  0.768  0.715  
  (0.492) (0.500) (0.422) (0.451) 
Those who have deployed      
Deployed more than once 0.144  0.400  0.106  0.279  
  (0.351) (0.490) (0.308) (0.449) 
Deployed 181-365 days during enlistment 0.541  0.519  0.184  0.262  
  (0.498) (0.500) (0.388) (0.440) 
Deployed more than 365 days during enlistment 0.315  0.212  0.020  0.058  
  (0.465) (0.409) (0.140) (0.235) 
Total days deployed during enlistment 341.1  244.0  132.5  174.9  
  (190.5) (166.0) (86.9) (502.4) 
Has been deployed to Iraq 0.874  0.872  0.094  0.411  
  (0.332) (0.334) (0.292) (0.492) 
Has been deployed to Afghanistan 0.087  0.054  0.009  0.091  
  (0.281) (0.226) (0.093) (0.287) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 0.942  0.903  0.101  0.486  
  (0.235) (0.296) (0.301) (0.500) 
Deployed to other location 0.070  0.188  0.878  0.607  
  (0.255) (0.390) (0.327) (0.488) 
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Share of those deployed that experience the  
following combat exposure Army Marine Navy 
Air  
Force 
Saw individual killed, wounded, dead  0.560  0.556  0.093  0.146  
during a deployment (0.497) (0.497) (0.291) (0.353) 
Reported seeing individual killed,  0.511  0.528  0.034  0.108  
wounded, or dead in Iraq (0.500) (0.499) (0.182) (0.310) 
Reported seeing individual killed,  0.043  0.024  0.002  0.014  
wounded, or dead in Afghanistan (0.203) (0.153) (0.046) (0.119) 
Reported seeing individual killed, wounded,  0.548  0.543  0.036  0.122  
or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan (0.498) (0.498) (0.187) (0.327) 
Fired their weapon during deployment 0.294  0.343  0.023  0.022  
  (0.455) (0.475) (0.150) (0.146) 
Reported firing any weapon in Iraq 0.270  0.329  0.011  0.015  
  (0.444) (0.470) (0.106) (0.122) 
Reported firing any weapon in Afghanistan 0.022  0.013  0.000  0.002  
  (0.146) (0.112) (0.021) (0.045) 
Reported firing any weapon in  0.289  0.339  0.012  0.017  
Iraq or Afghanistan (0.454) (0.473) (0.108) (0.130) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected any  0.352  0.348  0.024  0.049  
destroyed military vehicle (0.478) (0.476) (0.152) (0.215) 
Reported being inside or inspected destroyed  0.325  0.333  0.015  0.038  
military vehicle in Iraq (0.468) (0.471) (0.122) (0.191) 
Reported being inside or inspected destroyed  0.022  0.007  0.001  0.003  
military vehicle in Afghanistan (0.145) (0.085) (0.027) (0.057) 
Reported being inside or inspected destroyed  0.344  0.339  0.016  0.042  
military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan (0.475) (0.474) (0.125) (0.199) 
Observations 30577 21303 9486 6486 
Standard deviations in parentheses         
     
 
The Army and Marine Corps, with 40.9% and 51% respectively deployed, have 
the largest portion of their total first-term enlistees deployed while the Navy or Air Force 
have had 23.2% and 28.5% deployed, respectively.  The small portion of first term 
enlistees in the Navy who have a PDHA record could be due to the fact that PDHAs are 
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not mandatory for sailors serving exclusively on ship31.  The low percentage of Air Force 
first-term enlistees who have been deployed, could be due to clustering of deployment 
amongst a small group of Air Force personnel.  While the Air Force has 28.5% of its 
first-term enlistees deployed, the average number of deployments experienced by those 
who have deployed is 1.37 deployments; higher than both the Army and Navy with 1.15 
and 1.11 average deployments respectively for those who have deployed.  It seems that 
deployments in the Air Force are concentrated among a small sample of its first-term 
population; while many in the Air Force may not deploy, those who do deploy, deployed 
repeatedly.   
While Army deployments are longer in duration, Marine personnel deploy more 
frequently.  The Army averages the most days deployed during an enlistment (341 days) 
while the Marine Corps averages the most total deployments (1.46) among first-term 
personnel with a deployment history.  Further evidence of shorter, but more frequent 
deployments experienced by Marines compared to Army personnel is that in both 
services 87% of members have deployed to Iraq, while the total average number of 
deployments to Iraq are .97 in the Army but 1.16 in the Marine Corps.  However, when 
deployments to either Iraq or Afghanistan are considered 94% of Army personnel who 
have deployed have been deployed to either of those locations, while 90% Marines have 
been to either of those locales; 10% of sailors, and 48.6% of airmen have been to either 
of those two hostile locations. 
The Army and Marine Corps reported a higher portion of their first-term enlisted 
force with combat exposure.  Army and Marine Corps personnel reported firing their 
weapons during deployments more than Navy or Air Force personnel; 29% of soldiers 
and 34% of Marines who have deployed reported firing their weapon during combat.  
Among Navy and Air Force personnel, only 2% reported firing their weapon during any 
deployment during their initial enlistment contract.   
                                                 
31 DoD Instruction 6490.03 states, “Shipboard operations that are not anticipated to involve operations 
ashore are exempt from the requirements of this Instruction except for recording individual daily 
deployment locations or when potential health threats indicate actions necessary beyond the scope of 
shipboard occupational health programs or per the decision of the commander exercising operation control” 
(2). 
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Among soldiers who have been deployed, 35.2% reported being inside, entering, 
or inspecting destroyed military vehicles; 34.8% of Marines, 2.4% of sailors, and 4.9% of 
airmen reported that same experience if they had been deployed.  Likewise, 56% of Army 
personnel and 55.6% of Marine personnel reported seeing an individual killed, wounded, 
or dead while on deployment, whereas 9.3% of Navy personnel and 14.6% of airmen 
reported that same experience.   
3. Staying Past Initial Obligation Characteristics 
Table 3 provides the portion of service members who have stayed past their initial 
contract obligation categorized by service affiliation regardless of deployment status.  
The table also provides summary statistics of deployment as well as combat exposure 
characteristics for service members who have stayed past their initial service obligation 
according to service affiliation. 
 
 45
Table 3.  Retention Characteristics  
  Army Marine Navy Air Force 
















Has been deployed 60.83% 35.97% 60.57% 48.47% 25.97% 22.45% 36.46% 26.28% 
  (0.488) (0.480) (0.489) (0.500) (0.439) (0.417) (0.481) (0.440) 
Has not been deployed 39.17% 64.03% 39.43% 51.53% 74.03% 77.55% 63.54% 73.72% 
  (0.488) (0.480) (0.489) (0.500) (0.439) (0.417) (0.481) (0.440) 
Has been deployed to Iraq 54.28% 31.17% 53.53% 42.07% 4.54% 1.57% 16.08% 10.50% 
  (0.498) (0.463) (0.499) (0.494) (0.208) (0.124) (0.367) (0.307) 
Has been deployed to Afghanistan 5.27% 3.11% 1.16% 3.22% 0.39% 0.15% 4.21% 2.14% 
  (0.224) (0.174) (0.107) (0.176) (0.063) (0.039) (0.201) (0.145) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 58.48% 33.57% 54.02% 43.98% 4.88% 1.67% 19.49% 12.28% 
 (0.493) (0.472) (0.498) (0.496) (0.216) (0.128) (0.396) (0.328) 
Deployed to other location 3.27% 2.76% 12.82% 8.67% 21.21% 20.13% 21.93% 16.02% 
  (0.178) (0.164) (0.334) (0.281) (0.409) (0.401) (0.414) (0.367) 
Total days deployed during enlistment 232.5  116.6  157.9  115.3  37.5  29.0  77.1  42.3  
  (254.1) (187.1) (173.5) (168.1) (80.5) (66.7) (427.6) (221.3) 
Saw individual killed, wounded, dead  34.37% 20.05% 30.65% 27.83% 3.97% 1.69% 6.12% 3.62% 
during ANY deployment (0.475) (0.400) (0.461) (0.448) (0.195) (0.129) (0.240) (0.187) 
Reported seeing individual  31.37% 18.30% 30.08% 26.12% 2.51% 0.35% 4.41% 2.70% 
killed, wounded, or dead in Iraq (0.464) (0.387) (0.459) (0.439) (0.156) (0.059) (0.205) (0.162) 
Reported seeing individual  2.56% 1.57% 0.39% 1.46% 0.12% 0.03% 0.61% 0.35% 
killed, wounded, or dead in Afghanistan (0.158) (0.124) (0.063) (0.120) (0.034) (0.018) (0.078) (0.059) 
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  Army Marine Navy Air Force 
Reported seeing individual  33.61% 19.63% 30.33% 27.09% 2.61% 0.38% 5.00% 3.04% 
killed, wounded, or dead in Iraq or 
Afghanistan (0.386) (0.303) (0.346) (0.333) (0.122) (0.043) (0.157) (0.114) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment 18.51% 10.40% 18.34% 17.32% 0.87% 0.45% 1.36% 0.42% 
  (0.388) (0.305) (0.387) (0.378) (0.093) (0.067) (0.116) (0.065) 
Reported firing any weapon in Iraq 16.79% 9.60% 18.09% 16.51% 0.77% 0.13% 0.91% 0.30% 
  (0.374) (0.295) (0.385) (0.371) (0.088) (0.036) (0.095) (0.054) 
Reported firing any weapon in 
Afghanistan 1.39% 0.77% 0.28% 0.75% 0.04% 0.00% 0.16% 0.03% 
  (0.117) (0.087) (0.053) (0.086) (0.019) (0.006) (0.040) (0.017) 
Reported firing any weapon in Iraq or 
Afghanistan 18.11% 10.29% 18.26% 17.10% 0.80% 0.14% 1.10% 0.32% 
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) 0.000  (0.010) 0.000  (0.008) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected   24.08% 11.99% 20.26% 17.11% 1.59% 0.28% 2.03% 1.21% 
destroyed military vehicles (0.428) (0.325) (0.402) (0.377) (0.125) (0.053) (0.141) (0.109) 
Reported being inside or inspected  22.30% 11.05% 19.70% 16.27% 1.28% 0.11% 1.42% 0.99% 
destroyed military vehicle in Iraq (0.416) (0.314) (0.398) (0.369) (0.113) (0.033) (0.118) (0.099) 
Reported being inside or inspected  1.33% 0.77% 0.15% 0.44% 0.07% 0.00% 0.20% 0.06% 
destroyed military vehicle in Afghanistan (0.114) (0.088) (0.039) (0.066) (0.027) (0.006) (0.045) (0.025) 
Reported being inside or inspected  23.54% 11.75% 19.80% 16.66% 1.35% 0.11% 1.63% 1.06% 
destroyed military vehicle in Iraq or 
Afghanistan (0.424) (0.322) (0.399) (0.373) (0.116) (0.033) (0.127) (0.102) 










Observations 14714  60119  9388  32219  8422  32516  4920  17855  
Standard deviations in parentheses                 
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When considering every member regardless of actual service length or 
reenlistment eligibility each of the Services have similar portions of their first-term 
enlisted members stay past their initial service obligation; Army (19.7%), Marine Corps 
(22.6%), Navy (20.6%), and Air Force (21.6%).  When only considering service 
members who have completed all but the last year of their enlistment contracts the 
Service have different portions of their first-term enlisted members stay past initial 
service obligation; Army (30.3%), Marine Corps (28.4%), Navy (36%), and Air Force 
(28.6%).  Among all of the Services, the Army (60.8%) has the largest portion of those 
who deployed and subsequently stayed past their initial obligation while the Navy has the 
largest portion that have stayed past their initial obligation and not deployed (74%).  The 
Army has the highest rate of those who stay past their initial obligation and have been 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan (58.5%) while only 4.8% of sailors who stayed past their 
initial obligation have been deployed to either of those hostile locations.  Among soldiers 
who stay in the Army past their initial obligation, the average days deployed is 232 days 
and is much more than any of the other services; the average Marine who stays past 
initial obligation has been deployed 158 total days during his or her initial enlistment.   
Army personnel (34.4%) and Marine personnel (30.7%) report similar portions of 
those who saw an individual killed during a deployment and subsequently stayed past 
their initial obligation; 4% of sailors and 6.1% of airmen fall in to that category.  
Likewise, both Army and Marine personnel report 18.5% and 18.3% respectively who 
have fired their weapon during deployment and later stayed past their initial obligation; 
less than 1% of sailors and 1.4% of airmen belong in this category.  About one-quarter 
(24.1%) of army personnel and 20.3% of Marine Corps personnel report being inside, 
entering, or inspecting destroyed military vehicles and also staying past their initial 





4. Non-EAS Separation Characteristics 
Table 4 provides the portion of service members who separated before completion 
of their first enlistment contract categorized by service affiliation.  The table also 
provides summary statistics of deployment and combat exposure characteristics for 
service members who are characterized with Non-EAS separation. 
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Table 4.  Attrition Characteristics  
  Army Marine Navy Air Force 















Has been deployed 19.55% 66.31% 18.66% 64.91% 16.80% 32.59% 11.16% 41.50% 
  (0.397) (0.473) (0.390) (0.477) (0.374) (0.469) (0.315) (0.493) 
Has NOT been deployed 80.45% 33.69% 81.34% 35.09% 83.20% 67.41% 88.84% 58.50% 
  (0.397) (0.473) (0.390) (0.477) (0.374) (0.469) (0.315) (0.493) 
Has been deployed to Iraq 16.44% 58.75% 15.03% 57.13% 1.36% 3.39% 4.00% 17.49% 
  (0.371) (0.492) (0.357) (0.495) (0.116) (0.181) (0.196) (0.380) 
Has been deployed to 
Afghanistan 1.50% 5.98% 1.31% 3.36% 0.12% 0.32% 0.64% 4.05% 
  (0.121) (0.237) (0.114) (0.180) (0.034) (0.057) (0.080) (0.197) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan 17.77% 63.19% 16.08% 58.95% 1.44% 3.65% 4.57% 20.80% 
  (0.382) (0.482) (0.367) (0.492) (0.119) (0.188) (0.209) (0.406) 
Deployed to other location 1.75% 4.19% 2.79% 12.48% 14.80% 28.55% 6.76% 25.21% 
  (0.131) (0.200) (0.165) (0.331) (0.355) (0.452) (0.251) (0.434) 
Total days deployed during 
enlistment 52.5  243.2  34.0  163.2  20.8  45.3  14.4  76.4  
  (134.8) (229.7) (90.6) (181.1) (57.2) (82.9) (48.6) (365.2) 
Saw individual killed, wounded, 
dead during ANY deployment 10.41% 37.74% 11.08% 35.79% 1.43% 3.25% 1.29% 6.31% 
 (0.305) (0.485) (0.314) (0.479) (0.119) (0.177) (0.113) (0.243) 
Reported seeing individual  9.35% 34.63% 10.04% 34.17% 0.38% 1.40% 0.92% 4.68% 
killed, wounded, or dead in Iraq (0.291) (0.476) (0.301) (0.474) (0.062) (0.117) (0.096) (0.211) 
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  Army Marine Navy Air Force 















Reported seeing individual  0.81% 2.90% 0.62% 1.47% 0.02% 0.08% 0.13% 0.62% 
killed, wounded, or dead in 
Afghanistan (0.090) (0.168) (0.079) (0.120) (0.016) (0.029) (0.036) (0.078) 
Reported seeing individual  10.12% 37.03% 10.56% 35.09% 0.41% 1.48% 1.06% 5.27% 
killed, wounded, or dead in Iraq 
or Afghanistan (0.302) (0.483) (0.307) (0.477) (0.064) (0.121) (0.103) (0.223) 
Fired their weapon during a 
deployment 5.08% 20.24% 7.02% 21.98% 0.41% 0.73% 0.16% 0.97% 
  (0.220) (0.402) (0.256) (0.414) (0.064) (0.085) (0.040) (0.098) 
Reported firing any weapon in 
Iraq 4.67% 18.58% 6.66% 21.16% 0.14% 0.45% 0.11% 0.67% 
  (0.211) (0.389) (0.249) (0.409) (0.037) (0.067) (0.034) (0.082) 
Reported firing any weapon in 
Afghanistan 0.36% 1.53% 0.26% 0.81% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.10% 
  (0.060) (0.123) (0.051) (0.089) (0.006) (0.014) 0.000  (0.032) 
Reported firing any weapon in 
Iraq or Afghanistan 5.02% 19.95% 6.88% 21.78% 0.14% 0.47% 0.11% 0.78% 
  (0.218) (0.400) (0.253) (0.413) (0.038) (0.068) (0.034) (0.088) 
Inside, entered, or closely 
inspected  5.73% 24.67% 6.07% 22.77% 0.26% 0.98% 0.64% 1.95% 
destroyed military vehicle (0.233) (0.431) (0.239) (0.419) (0.051) (0.099) (0.080) (0.138) 
Reported being inside or 
inspected destroyed military 5.22% 22.85% 5.69% 21.82% 0.11% 0.70% 0.52% 1.51% 
vehicle in Iraq (0.223) (0.420) (0.232) (0.413) (0.034) (0.083) (0.072) (0.122) 
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  Army Marine Navy Air Force 
Reported being inside or 
inspected  0.38% 1.48% 0.18% 0.46% 0.00% 0.04% 0.03% 0.14% 
destroyed military vehicle in 
Afghanistan (0.061) (0.121) (0.042) (0.068) (0.006) (0.019) (0.018) (0.037) 
Reported being inside or 
inspected  5.60% 24.19% 5.85% 22.22% 0.12% 0.73% 0.55% 1.65% 
destroyed military vehicle in Iraq 
or Afghanistan (0.230) (0.428) (0.235) (0.416) (0.034) (0.085) (0.074) (0.128) 










Observations 40730 34103 12332 29275 24415 16523 9774 13001 
Standard deviations in 
parentheses                        
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Regardless of deployment history, the Navy has the highest portion of first-term 
service members separate before the end of their service contract (59.6%),  while the 
smallest portion of first term service members who separate before the end of EAS reside 
in the Marine Corps (29.6%).  The unexpectedly large percentage of sailors who separate 
before the end of their service contract is due to the fact that the attrition rate for sailors in 
the 2002 year cohort was 73%.  In each of the Services the vast majority of those who 
separate before the end of their service contract have never deployed; 80.5% in the Army, 
81.3% in the Marine Corps, 83.2% in the Navy, and 88.8% in the Air Force.  The Army 
has the highest portion of members who attrite and have been deployed (19.6%) and the 
Air Force has the smallest portion of members who prematurely separate and have been 
deployed (11.2%). 
Army personnel (10.4%) and Marine Corps personnel (11.1%) report similar 
portions of their respective forces who have witnessed an individual killed, wounded, or 
dead during deployment and have non-EAS separation; 1.4% of sailors and 1.3% of 
airmen fall in to this category.  Likewise, 5.1% of soldiers and 7.1% of Marines reported 
discharging their weapons during deployment and subsequently are characterized with 
non-EAS separation; less than 1% of sailors and airmen belong in this category.  There 
are similar portions of those who reported being inside, entering, or closely inspecting 
military vehicles and have non-EAS separation according to service affiliation; 5.7% in 
the Army, 6.1% in the Marine Corps, and less than 1% in the Navy and Air Force have 












VII. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter presents the marginal effects of the four probit models used in this 
study.  Section A compares various models using likelihood ratio tests. Section B 
presents the marginal results for the early attrition outcome; each of the Services is 
presented separately.  Section C presents the marginal effects for the reenlistment 
outcome.  Section D and Section E presents the sensitivity analysis of the models.  
Section F provides a summary of the regression results.  Each tables depict only the key 
explanatory variables, full regression tables with the remaining explanatory variables are 
found in Appendix C through Appendix F. 
A. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ATTRITION 
1. Marine Corps Personnel 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression for U.S. Marine Corps personnel.  
Marginal effects of the key independent variables are presented for ease in interpretation; 
full regression tables are found in Appendix C. 
Table 5.  Marine Corps Personnel Regression Results for Attrition 
Marine Corps Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  0.031***     0.118*** 
during ANY deployment (0.010)     (0.035) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment 0.005     -0.046 
 (0.010)     (0.058) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected -0.025*** -0.022***   -0.001 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.008) (0.009)   (0.040) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    0.013     
during deployment   (0.011)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    -0.089     
during deployment   (0.091)     
Discharged weapon from the SEA    -0.008     
during deployment   (0.137)     
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Marine Corps Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Saw a COALITION member    -0.022**     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.009)     
Saw an ENEMY    0.033***     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.011)     
Saw a CIVILIAN   0.012     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.010)     
Reported seeing individual killed,      0.023** -0.085*** 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.010) (0.031) 
Reported firing any weapon in      0.008 0.058 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.010) (0.067) 
Reported exposure to destroyed     -0.025*** -0.024 
military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.009) (0.040) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan -0.261*** -0.254*** -0.258*** -0.257*** 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Deployed to other location -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.163*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
LR Chi2 (For joint significance of combat 
exposure variables) 16.74 28.11 12.31 24.58 
Prob>Chi2 .0008 .0002 .0064 .0004 
Observations 41607 41607 41607 41607 
Standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1%         
 
Model One 
The non-EAS separation (henceforth attrition) rate is very different between those 
that were deployed and those who were not.  Specifically, deployment to either Iraq or 
Afghanistan decreases the likelihood a first-term enlisted Marine will attrite by 26.1 
percentage points, while deployment to other locations reduces the likelihood of attrition 
by 15.8 percentage points compared to a Marine who has not deployed, holding all other 
factors constant.  Since I control for whether a service member was deployed (and the 
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deployment location), all subsequent discussion on combat exposure effect is comparing 
service members who have been deployed to the same location categories (Iraq or 
Afghanistan or other locations). 
Among those deployed to the same location categories, witnessing death or injury 
results in a 3.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of attrition (p<.01) while 
exposure to a destroyed military vehicle leads to a 2.5 percentage point decrease (p<0.01) 
in the attrition rate of a first-term enlisted Marine compared to a deployed Marine who 
did not have such exposure.  To put the magnitude in perspective, the average rate of 
attrition for Marine Corps personnel who have deployed is about 10.8%.  This would 
imply that witnessing death increases attrition rate by 28.7% and exposure to a destroyed 
vehicle reduces attrition rate by 23.2%.  While it’s not surprising that witnessing death 
might increase attrition rate; exposure to destroyed military vehicles could provide some 
sense of the adventure that service members cited in the survey findings and referenced 
by Hosek and Totten (1998).  
Model Two 
There are seven key variables of interest in Model Two that measure finer details 
of combat exposure; of those seven variables, three are statistically significant.  
Witnessing the death of a coalition member results in a 2.2 percentage point decrease 
(p<0.05) in the attrition rate compared to a Marine who deployed with no such combat 
experience.  However, witnessing death or injury of enemy combatants results in a 3.3 
percentage point increase (p<0.01) in attrition rate compared to a Marine who has been 
deployed to a comparable location.  The attrition effects of exposure to destroyed military 
vehicles and deployments remain relatively unchanged from Model One. 
Model Three 
 Model Three focuses on the effects of combat exposure that occurs only in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  A Marine who witnesses death or injury while in Iraq or Afghanistan is 2.3 
percentage points (p<.05) more likely to attrite than a Marine deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan with no such combat experience.  Exposure to destroyed military vehicles in 
Iraq or Afghanistan decreases the probability of attrition by 2.5 percentage points (p<.01) 
compared to a Marine deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with no such exposure. 
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Model Four 
Model Four examines whether combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or 
Afghanistan has a differential effect on attrition rate than combat exposure that occurs in 
other locations. The last column of Table 5 shows that a Marine who witnesses injury or 
death while deployed outside Iraq or Afghanistan is 11.8 percentage points (p<.01) more 
likely to attrite than a Marine deployed to the same location but with no such experience. 
A Marine who witnesses death or injury while deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan is 3.3 
percentage points (11.8-8.5=3.3) more likely to attrite compared to a Marine deployed to 
Iraq or Afghanistan with no such experience. The 8.5 percentage point difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that there is indeed differential effect 
on attrition rates between this type of combat exposure that occur in the two different 
location categories.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, all models group Afghanistan and Iraq into 
the same location categories due to the small sample size in Afghanistan.  In a sensitivity 
analysis Model Four is further refined by separating out combat exposures that occur in 
Iraq from those that occurred in Afghanistan.  Not surprisingly, the estimated effects have 
large standard errors and the results observed in Model Four are largely driven by the 
combat exposures in Iraq. 
 Summary 
 Being deployed (regardless of location) has a negative effect on the attrition rate 
and remains relatively unchanged across each model specification.  The average rate of 
attrition for Marine Corps personnel that were deployed is 10.8%; one can therefore 
assess the magnitude of the effect (in terms of percent change in attrition rate) by 
dividing the coefficients reported in the previous models by this average attrition rate.  
The combat exposure that appears to have the most adverse effect on attrition rate for the 
Marine Corps enlisted members is witnessing a person’s death or injury while deployed 
to locations outside Iraq or Afghanistan.   
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2. Navy Personnel 
Table 6 presents the results of the regression for U.S. Navy personnel.  Marginal 
effects of the key independent variables are presented for ease in interpretation; full 
regression tables are found in Appendix D. 
Table 6.  Navy Personnel Regression Results for Attrition 
Navy Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  -0.012     0.001 
during ANY deployment (0.019)     (0.022) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment 0.017     0.051 
  (0.035)     (0.045) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected -0.086** -0.060   0.028 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.040) (0.041)   (0.053) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    0.033     
during deployment   (0.058)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    -0.146     
during deployment   (0.194)     
Discharged weapon from the SEA    0.043     
during deployment   (0.076)     
Saw a COALITION member    0.001     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.025)     
Saw an ENEMY    -0.102**     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.047)     
Saw a CIVILIAN   -0.012     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.027)     
Reported seeing individual killed,      -0.029 -0.030 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.042) (0.048) 
Reported firing any weapon in      0.012 -0.041 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.058) (0.078) 
Reported exposure to destroyed      -0.166*** -0.196** 
military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.060) (0.084) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan -0.167*** -0.153*** -0.150*** -0.150*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
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Navy Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Deployed to other location -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.145*** -0.146*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
LR Chi2 (For joint significance of combat 
exposure variables) 6.10 12.82 13.28 14.79 
Prob>Chi2 .1079 .0766 .0041 .0219 
Observations 40938 40938 40938 40938 
Standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%         
 
Model One 
Similar to Marine Corps personnel, the attrition rate of first-term sailors is very 
different between sailors that were deployed, and those who were not.  Specifically, 
deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan decreases the likelihood a first-term enlisted 
sailor will attrite by 16.7 percentage points while deployment to other locations reduces 
the likelihood of attrition by 14.4 percentage points compared to a sailor who has not 
deployed, while holding all other factors constant.   
Among those deployed to the same location categories, exposure to a destroyed 
military vehicle leads to an 8.6 percentage point decrease (p<0.05) in the attrition rate of 
a first-term enlisted sailor compared to a deployed sailor who did not have such exposure.  
To put the magnitude in perspective, since the average rate of attrition for U.S. Navy 
personnel who have deployed is about 43.2% this would imply that exposure to a 
destroyed vehicle reduces attrition rate by 19.9%.  Contrary to the Marine Corps, 
witnessing death has no effect on attrition rate among Navy enlisted. 
Model Two 
There are seven key variables of interest in Model Two that measure finer details 
of combat exposure; of those seven variables, one is statistically significant.  Witnessing 
the death or injury of enemy combatants results in a 10.2 percentage point decrease 
(p<0.05) in attrition rate compared to a sailor who has been deployed to a comparable 
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location.  While the attrition effects of exposure to destroyed military vehicles become 
statistically insignificant, the attrition effects of deployments remain relatively unchanged 
from Model One. 
Model Three 
 Model Three focuses on the effects of combat exposure that occurs only in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  Exposure to destroyed military vehicles in Iraq or Afghanistan decreases 
the probability of attrition by 16.6 percentage points (p<.01) compared to a sailor 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with no such exposure.   
Model Four 
Model Four examines whether combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or 
Afghanistan has a differential effect on attrition rate than combat exposure that occurs in 
other locations. The last column of Table 6 shows that exposure to destroyed military 
vehicles outside Iraq or Afghanistan has a statistically insignificant effect on the attrition 
rate. A sailor who is exposed to destroyed military vehicles while deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan is 16.8 percentage points (2.8-19.6=-16.8) less likely to attrite compared to a 
sailor deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with no such experience. The 19.6 percentage 
point difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that there is indeed 
differential effect on attrition rates between this type of combat exposure that occur in the 
two different location categories.  
In a sensitivity analysis, Model Four is further refined by separating out combat 
exposures that occur in Iraq from those that occurred in Afghanistan; the estimated 
effects have large standard errors and the results observed in Model Four are largely 
driven by the combat exposures in Iraq. 
 Summary 
 Being deployed (regardless of location) has a negative effect on the attrition rate 
and remains relatively unchanged across each model specification.  The average rate of 
attrition for U.S. Navy personnel that were deployed is 43.2%.  One can therefore assess 
the magnitude of the effect (in terms of percent change in attrition rate) by dividing the 
coefficients reported in the previous models by this average attrition rate.  The combat 
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exposure that appears to have the most adverse effect on attrition rate for enlisted sailors 
is exposure to destroyed military vehicles in Iraq or Afghanistan.   
3. Air Force Personnel 
Table 7 presents the results of the regression for U.S. Air Force personnel.  
Marginal effects of the key independent variables are presented for ease in interpretation; 
full regression tables are found in Appendix E. 
Table 7.  Air Force Personnel Regression Results for Attrition 
Air Force Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  -0.049**     -0.059 
during ANY deployment (0.024)     (0.049) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment 0.013     0.067 
  (0.058)     (0.111) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected 0.124*** 0.117***   0.129 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.036) (0.037)   (0.087) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    0.084     
during deployment   (0.073)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    -0.066     
during deployment   (0.231)     
Saw a COALITION member    -0.027     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.030)     
Saw an ENEMY    -0.093**     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.039)     
Saw a CIVILIAN   0.032     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.040)     
Reported seeing individual killed,      -0.045* 0.013 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.027) (0.058) 
Reported firing any weapon in      -0.008 -0.071 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.068) (0.121) 
Reported exposure to destroyed      0.123*** -0.005 
military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.040) (0.093) 
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Air Force Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan -0.305*** -0.306*** -0.305*** -0.305*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Deployed to other location -0.292*** -0.293*** -0.293*** -0.292*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
LR Chi2 (For joint significance of combat 
exposure variables) 13.53 18.68 10.27 13.89 
Prob>Chi2 .0036 .0047 .0164 .0309 
Observations 22775 22773 22775 22775 
Standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%         
 
Model One 
Similar to the other services, the attrition rate in the U.S. Air Force is very 
different between those that were deployed and those who were not.  The previous 
chapter shows that the average attrition rate for those who have never been deployed is 
53.3%.  The multivariate analysis reported here shows deployment to either Iraq or 
Afghanistan decreases the likelihood a first-term enlisted airman will later attrite by 30.5 
percentage points (p<.01) while deployment to other locations reduces the likelihood of 
attrition by 29.2 percentage points (p<.01) compared to an airman who has not deployed, 
while holding all other factors constant.   
Among those deployed to the same location categories, witnessing death or injury 
results in a 4.9 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of attrition (p<.05) while 
exposure to a destroyed military vehicle leads to a 12.4 percentage point increase 
(p<0.01) in the attrition rate of a first-term enlisted airman compared to a deployed 
airman who did not have such exposure.  To put the magnitude in perspective, since the 
average rate of attrition for U.S. Air Force personnel who have deployed is 16.8% this 
would imply that witnessing death decreases attrition rate by 29.1% and exposure to a 





There are seven key variables of interest in Model Two that measure finer details 
of combat exposure; of those seven variables, two are statistically significant.  Witnessing 
the death or injury of enemy combatants results in a 9.3 percentage point decrease 
(p<0.05) in attrition rate compared to an airman who has been deployed to a comparable 
location but had no such experience.  The attrition effects of exposure to destroyed 
military vehicles and deployments remain relatively unchanged from Model One. 
Model Three 
 Model Three focuses on the effects of combat exposure that occurs only in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  An airman who witnesses death or injury while in Iraq or Afghanistan is 
4.5 percentage points (p<.10) less likely to attrite than an airman deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan with no such combat experience.  Exposure to destroyed military vehicles in 
Iraq or Afghanistan increases the probability of attrition by 12.3 percentage points 
(p<.01) compared to an airman deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with no such exposure. 
Model Four 
Model Four examines whether combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or 
Afghanistan has a differential effect on attrition rate than combat exposure that occurs in 
other locations.  None of the three variables that measure combat exposure that occurs in 
Iraq or Afghanistan is statistically significant indicating that there is no differential effect 
on attrition rates between combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or Afghanistan and combat 
exposure that occurs elsewhere. 
In a sensitivity analysis, Model Four is further refined by separating out combat 
exposures that occur in Iraq from that which occurred in Afghanistan.  Not surprisingly, 
the estimated effects have large standard errors and the results observed in Model Four 
are largely driven by the combat exposures in Iraq. 
 Summary 
 Being deployed (regardless of location) has a negative effect on the attrition rate 
and remains relatively unchanged across each model specification.  The average rate of 
attrition for U.S. Air Force personnel that were deployed is 16.8%; one can therefore 
assess the magnitude of the effect (in terms of percent change in attrition rate) by 
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dividing the coefficients reported in the previous models by this average attrition rate.  
The combat exposure that appears to have the most adverse effect on attrition rate for the 
Air Force enlisted members is exposure to destroyed military vehicles while deployed.  
4.  Army Personnel 
Table 8 presents the results of the regression for U.S. Army personnel.  Marginal 
effects of the key independent variables are presented for ease in interpretation; full 
regression tables are found in Appendix F. 
Table 8.  Army Personnel Regression Results for Attrition 
Army Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  0.022***     -0.015 
during ANY deployment (0.007)     (0.034) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment -0.014*     -0.116* 
  (0.008)     (0.061) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected -0.052*** -0.050***   -0.101** 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.007) (0.007)   (0.042) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    -0.023***     
during deployment   (0.009)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    0.034     
during deployment   (0.068)     
Discharged weapon from the SEA    0.102     
during deployment   (0.117)     
Saw a COALITION member    -0.009     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.008)     
Saw an ENEMY    0.045***     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.008)     
Saw a CIVILIAN   -0.010     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.008)     
Reported seeing individual killed,      0.025*** 0.040 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.008) (0.034) 
Reported firing any weapon in      -0.013 0.099* 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.008) (0.058) 
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Army Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Reported exposure to destroyed      -0.051*** 0.049 
military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.042) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan -0.412*** -0.408*** -0.414*** -0.414*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Deployed to other location -0.278*** -0.277*** -0.280*** -0.268*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
LR Chi2 (For joint significance of combat 
exposure variables) 61.50 84.03 55.51 73.67 
Prob>Chi2 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Observations 74828 74828 74828 74828 
Standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%         
 
Model One 
The attrition rate is very different between soldiers that were deployed and those 
who were not; the attrition rate for soldiers who have been deployed is 26% and the 
attrition rate for soldiers who have never been deployed is 74%.  Specifically, 
deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan decreases the likelihood of a first-term enlisted 
soldier’s attrition by 41.2 percentage points (p<.01) while deployment to other locations 
reduces the likelihood of attrition by 27.8 percentage points (p<.01) compared to a soldier 
who has not deployed, while holding all other factors constant.  Hosek and Martorell 
(2009) did find a large increase in reenlistment rates for first-term soldiers with two or 
more hostile deployments in 2005 (p. 53).  It is hypothesized that the large decrease in 
attrition rate found among soldiers deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan is the inverse of large 
reenlistment probability found by Hosek and Martorell for soldier with two or more 
deployments in 2005. 
Among those deployed to the same location categories, witnessing death or injury 
results in a 2.2 percentage point increase in the likelihood of attrition (p<.01) while firing 
a weapon leads to a 1.4 percentage point decrease in the attrition rate (p<.10) of soldiers.  
Exposure to a destroyed military vehicle leads to a 5.2 percentage point decrease 
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(p<0.01) in the attrition rate of a first-term enlisted soldier compared to a deployed 
soldier who did not have such exposure.  To put the magnitude in perspective, the 
average rate of attrition for U.S. Army personnel who have deployed is about 26%.  This 
would imply that witnessing death increases attrition rate by 8.4%, firing a weapon 
decreases attrition rate by 5.4%, and exposure to a destroyed vehicle reduces attrition rate 
by 20%.  
Model Two 
There are seven key variables of interest in Model Two that measure finer details 
of combat exposure; of those seven variables, two are statistically significant.  Witnessing 
the death or serious injury of an enemy combatant leads to a 4.5 percentage point increase 
(p<0.01) in the attrition rate compared to a deployed soldier with no such exposure.  
However, firing a weapon from the land during deployment results in a 2.3 percentage 
point decrease (p<.01) in the attrition rate compared to a deployed soldier with no such 
exposure.  The attrition effects of exposure to destroyed military vehicles and 
deployments remain relatively unchanged from Model One. 
Model Three 
 Model Three focuses on the effects of combat exposure that occurs only in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  A soldier who witnesses death or injury while in Iraq or Afghanistan is 2.5 
percentage points (p<.01) more likely to attrite than a soldier deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan with no such combat experience.  Exposure to destroyed military vehicles in 
Iraq or Afghanistan decreases the probability of attrition by 5.1 percentage points (p<.01) 
compared to a soldier deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with no such exposure.  The 
attrition effects of deployments remain relatively unchanged from Models One and Two. 
Model Four 
Model Four examines whether combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or 
Afghanistan has a differential effect on attrition rate than combat exposure that occurs in 
other locations. The last column of Table 8 shows that a soldier who fired a weapon 
while deployed outside Iraq or Afghanistan is 11.6 percentage points (p<.010) less likely 
to attrite than a soldier deployed to the same location category but with no such 
experience. A soldier who fired a weapon while deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan is 1.7 
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percentage points (9.9-11.6=1.7) less likely to attrite compared to a soldier deployed to 
Iraq or Afghanistan with no such experience. The 9.9 percentage point difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level, indicating that there is indeed differential effect 
on attrition rates between this type of combat exposure that occur in the two different 
location categories.  
Exposure to destroyed military vehicles while deployed outside Iraq or 
Afghanistan results in a 10.1 percentage point decrease in the attrition rate (p<.05) 
compared to soldiers deployed to the same locations category but with no such 
experience.  The attrition effect of exposure to destroyed military vehicles in Iraq or 
Afghanistan is not statistical significant, indicated there is no differential effect on the 
attrition rate between soldiers who were exposed to destroyed military vehicles in Iraq or 
Afghanistan and soldiers with the same exposure elsewhere.  
In a sensitivity analysis Model Four is further refined by separating out combat 
exposures that occur in Iraq from those that occurred in Afghanistan; the estimated 
effects have large standard errors and the results observed in Model Four are largely 
driven by the combat exposures in Iraq. 
 Summary 
 Deployment has a negative effect on the attrition rate and remains relatively 
unchanged across each model specification.  The average rate of attrition for U.S. Army 
personnel that were deployed is 26%; one can therefore assess the magnitude of the effect 
(in terms of percent change in attrition rate) by dividing the coefficients reported in the 
previous models by this average attrition rate.  Exposure to destroyed military vehicles is 
the combat exposure that appears to most decrease the attrition rate for first-term enlisted 







B. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR REENLISTMENT 
1. Marine Corps Personnel 
Table 9.  Marine Corps Personnel Regression Results for Reenlistment 
Marine Corps Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  -0.036***     -0.139*** 
during ANY deployment (0.007)     (0.031) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment -0.026***     -0.094* 
  (0.007)     (0.055) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected -0.000 -0.002   0.030 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.007) (0.007)   (0.036) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    -0.018**     
during deployment   (0.008)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    -0.091*     
during deployment   (0.050)     
Discharged weapon from the SEA    -0.025     
during deployment   (0.103)     
Saw a COALITION member    -0.013*     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.007)     
Saw an ENEMY    -0.033***     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.008)     
Saw a CIVILIAN   0.005     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.008)     
Reported seeing individual killed,      -0.030*** 0.125*** 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.040) 
Reported firing any weapon in      -0.027*** 0.081 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.079) 
Reported exposure to destroyed      -0.003 -0.030 
military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.032) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.004 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Deployed to other location 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
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Marine Corps Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
LR Chi2 (For joint significance of combat 
exposure variables) 67.73 65.33 56.19 83.48 
Prob>Chi2 .0000 .000 .0000 .0000 
Observations 30654 30654 30654 30654 
Standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%         
 
Model One 
The continuation (henceforth reenlistment) rate of Marine Corps personnel is not 
very different between those that were deployed and those who were not; the reenlistment 
rate for Marines who have deployed is 27.7% and 29.7% for Marines that have not 
deployed, based on descriptive statistics in the previous chapter (Table 3).  Specifically, 
deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan does not significantly affect the likelihood that a 
first-term enlisted Marine will reenlist.  However, deployment to other locations 
increases the likelihood of reenlistment by 2.6 percentage points (p<.01) compared to a 
Marine who has not deployed, while holding all other factors constant.  As in the attrition 
models I control for whether a service member was deployed (and the deployed location) 
all subsequent discussion on combat exposure effect is comparing service members who 
have been deployed to the same location categories (Iraq or Afghanistan or other 
locations). 
Among Marines deployed to the same location categories, witnessing death or 
injury results in a 3.6 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of reenlistment (p<.01) 
while firing a weapon leads to a 2.6 percentage point decrease (p<0.01) in the 
reenlistment rate of a first-term enlisted Marine compared to a deployed Marine who did 
not have such experience.  To put the magnitude in perspective, the average rate of 
reenlistment for Marine Corps personnel who have deployed is about 27.7%.  This would 
imply that witnessing an individual’s death decreases the reenlistment rate by 13% and 




There are seven key variables of interest in Model Two that measure finer details 
of combat exposure; of those seven variables, four are statistically significant.  Exposure 
to the death or serious injury of a coalition member results in a 1.3 percentage point 
decrease (p<0.10) in reenlistment rate while witnessing the death of enemy combatants 
results in a 3.3 percentage point decrease (p<0.01) in the reenlistment rate compared to a 
deployed Marine with no such combat experience.  Firing a weapon from the land 
decreases reenlistment rate by 1.8 percentage points (p<.05) while firing a weapon from 
the air has a more pronounced affect; decreasing reenlistment rate 9.1 percentage points 
(p<.10) compared to a Marine without those same experiences.  The reenlistment effect 
of exposure to destroyed military vehicles and deployments remain relatively unchanged 
from Model One. 
Model Three 
 Model Three focuses on the effects of combat exposure that occurs only in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  A Marine who witnesses death or injury while in Iraq or Afghanistan is 3 
percentage points (p<.01) less likely to reenlist than a Marine deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan with no such combat experience.  A Marine who fires a weapon in Iraq or 
Afghanistan is 2.7 percentage points (p<.01) less likely to reenlist than one deployed to 
the same location category with no such combat exposure. Similar to Models One and 
Two, exposure to destroyed military vehicles and deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan 
remain statistically insignificant and deployments to other locations maintain the same 
affect on Marine reenlistment rates. 
Model Four 
Model Four examines whether combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or 
Afghanistan has a differential effect on reenlistment rate than combat exposure that 
occurs in other locations. The last column of Table 9 shows that a Marine who witnesses 
injury or death while deployed outside Iraq or Afghanistan is 13.9 percentage points 
(p<.01) less likely to reenlist than a Marine deployed to the same location but with no 
such experience. A Marine who witnesses death or injury while deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan is 1.4 percentage points (12.5-13.9=1.4) less likely to reenlist compared to a 
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Marine deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with no such experience. The 12.5 percentage 
point difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that there is indeed 
differential effect on reenlistment rates between this type of combat exposure that occur 
in the two different location categories.  A Marine who fires a weapon while deployed 
outside Iraq or Afghanistan is 9.4 percentage points (p<.10) less likely to reenlist than a 
Marine deployed to the same location but lacking that experience.  Firing a weapon while 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan is not statistically significant which indicates there is no 
differential effect on reenlistment rates between firing a weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan 
and firing a weapon elsewhere. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, all models group Afghanistan and Iraq into 
the same location categories due to the small sample size deployed in Afghanistan.  In a 
sensitivity analysis, Model Four is further refined by separating out combat exposures 
that occur in Iraq from those that occurred in Afghanistan. The estimated effects have 
large standard errors and the results observed in Model Four are largely driven by the 
combat exposures in Iraq. 
 Summary 
 Being deployed to other locations has a positive effect on the reenlistment rate 
and remains relatively unchanged across each model specification.  Deployment to Iraq 
or Afghanistan has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on Marine reenlistment 
rate and remains relatively unchanged across each model specification.  The average rate 
of reenlistment for Marine Corps personnel that were deployed is 27.7%; one can 
therefore assess the magnitude of the effect (in terms of percent change in reenlistment 
rate) by dividing the coefficients reported in the previous models by this average 
reenlistment rate.  Neither exposure to destroyed military vehicles nor deployments to 
Iraq or Afghanistan have a statistically significant effect on first-term enlisted Marines 
reenlistment rates. The combat exposure that appears to have the most adverse effect on 
reenlistment rate for the Marine Corps members is witnessing a person’s death or injury 




2. Navy Personnel 
Table 10.  Navy Personnel Regression Results for Reenlistment 
Navy Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  -0.003     -0.017 
during ANY deployment (0.023)     (0.026) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment -0.091**     -0.105 
  (0.042)     (0.078) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected 0.171*** 0.167***   0.079 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.050) (0.050)   (0.073) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    -0.027     
during deployment   (0.065)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    -0.167     
during deployment   (0.111)     
Discharged weapon from the SEA    -0.205**     
during deployment   (0.084)     
Saw a COALITION member    -0.002     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.031)     
Saw an ENEMY    -0.041     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.045)     
Saw a CIVILIAN   0.006     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.031)     
Reported seeing individual killed,      0.026 0.045 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.048) (0.057) 
Reported firing any weapon in      -0.109** -0.006 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.049) (0.121) 
Reported exposure to destroyed      0.226*** 0.136 
military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.070) (0.103) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
Deployed to other location -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.035*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
LR Chi2 (For joint significance of combat 
exposure variables) 15.07 16.08 15.54 18.49 
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Navy Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Prob>Chi2 .0018 .0244 .0014 .0051 
Observations 22106 22106 22106 22106 
Standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%         
 
Model One 
The reenlistment rate is very different between sailors that were deployed and 
those who were not; the reenlistment rate for sailors who have deployed is 28.9% and 
39.6% for sailors that have not deployed.  Specifically, deployment to either Iraq or 
Afghanistan increases the likelihood a first-term enlisted sailor’s reenlistment by 10 
percentage points (p<.01) while deployment to other locations decreases the likelihood of 
reenlistment by 3.6 percentage points (p<.01) compared to a sailor who has not deployed, 
while holding all other factors constant.   
Among those deployed to the same location categories, firing a weapon leads to a 
9.1 percentage point decrease (p<0.05) in the reenlistment rate of a first-term enlisted 
sailor compared to a deployed sailor who did not have such exposure.  Exposure to 
destroyed military vehicles leads to a 17.1 percentage point (p<.01) increase in 
reenlistment rate compared to a deployed sailor who did not have exposure to destroyed 
vehicles while deployed.  To put the magnitude in perspective, the average rate of 
reenlistment for sailors who have deployed is 28.9% implying that firing a weapon 
decreases the U.S. Navy personnel’s reenlistment rate by 31.5% and exposure to 
destroyed military vehicles increase reenlistment rate by 59.1%.  
Model Two 
There are seven key variables of interest in Model Two that measure finer details 
of combat exposure; of those seven variables, two are statistically significant.  
Discharging a weapon from the sea results in a 20.5 percentage point decrease (p<0.05) 
in the reenlistment rate compared to a deployed sailor with no such experience.  The 
reenlistment effect of exposure to destroyed military vehicles and deployments remain 
relatively unchanged from Model One. 
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Model Three 
 Model Three focuses on the effects of combat exposure that occurs only in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  A sailor who fires a weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan is 10.9 percentage 
points (p<.05) less likely to reenlist than a sailor deployed to the same location category 
with no such combat experience. A sailor exposed to destroyed vehicles in Iraq or 
Afghanistan is 22.6 percentage points (p<.01) more likely to reenlist than a sailor 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan without exposure to destroyed vehicles.  The 
reenlistment effects of deployments remain relatively unchanged from Models One and 
Two. 
Model Four 
Model Four examines whether combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or 
Afghanistan has a differential effect on attrition rate than combat exposure that occurs in 
other locations.  None of the three variables that measure combat exposure that occurs in 
Iraq or Afghanistan is statistically significant and indicates that there is no differential 
effect on attrition rates between combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or Afghanistan and 
combat exposure that occurs elsewhere. 
In a sensitivity analysis, Model Four is further refined by separating out combat 
exposures that occur in Iraq from those that occurred in Afghanistan; the estimated 
effects have large standard errors and the results observed in Model Four are largely 
driven by the combat exposures in Iraq. 
 Summary 
 Being deployed to other locations has a negative effect on the reenlistment rate 
and remains relatively unchanged across each model specification.  Deployment to Iraq 
or Afghanistan has a positive effect on sailor reenlistment rates and remains relatively 
unchanged across each model specification.  The average rate of reenlistment for U.S. 
Navy personnel that were deployed is 28.9%; one can therefore assess the magnitude of 
the effect (in terms of percent change in reenlistment rate) by dividing the coefficients 
reported in the previous models by this average reenlistment rate.  The combat exposure 
that appears to have the most adverse effect on reenlistment rate for sailors is firing a 
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weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Exposure to destroyed military vehicles while deployed 
to Iraq or Afghanistan has the largest positive effect on a sailor’s reenlistment rate. 
3.  Air Force Personnel 
Table 11.  Air Force Personnel Regression Results for Reenlistment 
Air Force Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  0.009     0.088** 
during ANY deployment (0.016)     (0.042) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment 0.141***     0.161 
  (0.047)     (0.106) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected 0.001 0.008   0.155* 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.025) (0.025)   (0.084) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    0.024     
during deployment   (0.049)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    -0.148***     
during deployment   (0.038)     
Saw a COALITION member    -0.001     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.020)     
Saw an ENEMY    0.039     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.028)     
Saw a CIVILIAN   0.013     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.026)     
Reported seeing individual killed,      -0.008 -0.074*** 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.017) (0.027) 
Reported firing any weapon in      0.149*** -0.008 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.053) (0.081) 
Reported exposure to destroyed      -0.020 -0.110*** 
military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.025) (0.033) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 0.016 0.016 0.022** 0.022** 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Deployed to other location 0.018** 0.020** 0.020** 0.014 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
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Air Force Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
LR Chi2 (For joint significance of combat 
exposure variables) 13.66 8.40 10.66 25.69 
Prob>Chi2 .0034 .2099 .0137 .0003 
Observations 13266 13265 13266 13266 
Standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%         
 
Model One 
The reenlistment rate is very different between airmen that were deployed and 
those who were not; the reenlistment rate for airmen who have deployed is 30.3% and 
27.3% for airmen that have not deployed.  Specifically, deployment to either Iraq or 
Afghanistan does not significantly affect the likelihood a first-term enlisted airman will 
reenlist.  However, deployment to other locations increases the likelihood of reenlistment 
by 1.8 percentage points (p<.05) compared to an airman who has not deployed, while 
holding all other factors constant.   
Among those deployed to the same location categories, firing a weapon leads to a 
14.1 percentage point increase (p<0.01) in the reenlistment rate of a first-term enlisted 
airman compared to a deployed airman who did not have such experience.  To put the 
magnitude in perspective, the average rate of reenlistment for airmen who have deployed 
is 30.3% implying that firing a weapon increases the U.S. Air Force personnel’s 
reenlistment rate by 46.6%.  
Model Two 
There are seven key variables of interest in Model Two that measure finer details 
of combat exposure; of those seven variables, only one is statistically significant.  
Discharging a weapon from the air results in a 14.8 percentage point decrease (p<0.01) in 
the reenlistment rate compared to a deployed airman with no such exposure.  The 
reenlistment effect of deployments remain relatively unchanged from Model One. 
Model Three 
 Model Three focuses on the effects of combat exposure that occurs only in Iraq or 
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Afghanistan.  An airman who fires a weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan is 14.9 percentage 
points (p<.01) more likely to reenlist than an airman deployed to the same location 
category with no such combat exposure. The reenlistment effects of deployments to Iraq 
or Afghanistan become statistically significant and result in a 2.2 percentage point 
(p<.05) increase in the likelihood to reenlist.  The reenlistment effects of deployments to 
other locations remain relatively unchanged from Models One and Two. 
Model Four 
Model Four examines whether combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or 
Afghanistan has a differential effect on reenlistment rate than combat exposure that 
occurs in other locations. The last column of Table 11 shows that an airman  who 
witnesses injury or death while deployed outside Iraq or Afghanistan is 8.8 percentage 
points (p<.05) more likely to reenlist than an airman deployed to the same location but 
with no such experience. An airman who witnesses death or injury while deployed to Iraq 
or Afghanistan is 1.4 percentage points (8.8-7.4=1.4) more likely to reenlist compared to 
an airman deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with no such experience. The 1.4 percentage 
point difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that there is indeed 
differential effect on reenlistment rates between this type of combat exposure that occur 
in the two different location categories.  An airman who is exposed to destroyed military 
vehicles while deployed outside Iraq or Afghanistan is 15.5 percentage points (p<.10) 
more likely to reenlist than an airman deployed to the same location category but with no 
such experience.  An airman exposed to destroyed military vehicles while deployed to 
Iraq or Afghanistan is 4.5 percentage points (15.5-11=4.5) more likely to reenlist 
compared to an airman deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with no such experience.  The 4.5 
percentage point difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level indicating that 
there is also a differential effect on reenlistment rates between this type of combat 
exposure that occur in the two location categories.  The reenlistment effects of 
deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan remain relatively unchanged from Model Three while 
the reenlistment effects of deployments to other locations become statistically 
insignificant when compared to the previous models. 
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In a sensitivity analysis Model Four is further refined by separating out combat 
exposures that occur in Iraq from those that occurred in Afghanistan; the estimated 
effects have large standard errors and the results observed in Model Four are largely 
driven by the combat exposures in Iraq. 
 Summary 
Being deployed to other locations has a positive effect on the reenlistment rate 
and remains relatively unchanged across Models One, Two, and Three.  Deployment to 
Iraq or Afghanistan has a positive effect on airman reenlistment rates and remains 
unchanged in Models Three and Four.  The average rate of reenlistment for U.S. Air 
Force personnel that were deployed is 30.3%; one can therefore assess the magnitude of 
the effect (in terms of percent change in reenlistment rate) by dividing the coefficients 
reported in the previous models by this average reenlistment rate.  Across each model 
specification, combat exposure has a positive effect on airmen reenlistment rates and the 
combat exposure that appears to have the largest effect on reenlistment rate for airmen is 
firing a weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan.   
4. Army Personnel 
Table 12.  Army Personnel Regression Results for Reenlistment 
Army Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  -0.002     -0.031 
during ANY deployment (0.007)     (0.033) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment 0.017**     0.184*** 
  (0.007)     (0.061) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected 0.020*** 0.018***   0.073* 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.007) (0.007)   (0.042) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    0.015*     
during deployment   (0.008)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    0.066     
during deployment   (0.071)     
Discharged weapon from the SEA    -0.043     
during deployment   (0.115)     
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Army Personnel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Saw a COALITION member    0.002     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.007)     
Saw an ENEMY    0.006     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.008)     
Saw a CIVILIAN   0.000     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.007)     
Reported seeing individual killed,      -0.001 0.030 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.035) 
Reported firing any weapon in      0.014* -0.139*** 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.008) (0.042) 
Reported exposure to destroyed      0.018*** -0.051 
military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.037) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Deployed to other location 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.026** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
LR Chi2 (For joint significance of combat 
exposure variables) 21.37 24.10 15.91 35.71 
Prob>Chi2 .0001 .0011 .0012 .0000 
Observations 39541 39541 39541 39541 
Standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%         
 
Model One 
Soldiers have different reenlistment rates depending on their deployment history; 
the reenlistment rate for soldiers who have deployed is 31.8% and 27.2% for soldiers that 
have not deployed.  Specifically, deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan increases the 
likelihood of reenlistment by 4.1 percentage points (p<.01) and deployment to other 
locations increases the likelihood of reenlistment by 3.4 percentage points (p<.01) 
compared to a soldier who has not deployed, while holding all other factors constant.   
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Among those deployed to the same location categories, firing a weapon leads to a 
1.7 percentage point increase (p<0.05) in the reenlistment rate of a first-term enlisted 
soldier compared to a deployed soldier who did not have such exposure.  Exposure to 
destroyed military vehicles leads to a two percentage point (p<.01) increase in the 
reenlistment rate of a soldier.  To put the magnitude in perspective, the average rate of 
reenlistment for soldiers who have deployed is 31.8% implying that firing a weapon 
increases a soldier’s reenlistment rate by 5.3% and exposure to destroyed military 
vehicles increases reenlistment rates by 6.3%.  
Model Two 
There are seven key variables of interest in Model Two that measure finer details 
of combat exposure; of those seven variables, two are statistically significant.  
Discharging a weapon from the land results in a 1.5 percentage point increase (p<0.10) in 
reenlistment rate compared to a deployed soldier with no such exposure.  Exposure to 
destroyed vehicles while deployed results in a 1.8 percentage point (p<.01) increase in 
the reenlistment rate compared to a deployed soldier who was never exposed to destroyed 
military vehicles while deployed.  The reenlistment effect of deployments remain 
relatively unchanged from Model One. 
Model Three 
 Model Three focuses on the effects of combat exposure that occurs only in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  A soldier who fires a weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan is 1.4 percentage 
points (p<.10) more likely to reenlist than a soldier deployed to the same location 
category with no such combat exposure.  A soldier exposed to destroyed vehicles in Iraq 
or Afghanistan is 1.8 percentage points (p<.01) more likely to reenlist than a soldier 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with no such exposure to destroyed military vehicles.  
The reenlistment effects of deployments remain relatively unchanged from Models One 
and Two. 
Model Four 
Model Four examines whether combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or 
Afghanistan has a differential effect on reenlistment rate than combat exposure that 
occurs in other locations. The last column of Table 12 shows that a soldier who fires a 
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weapon while deployed outside Iraq or Afghanistan is 18.4 percentage points (p<.01) 
more likely to reenlist than a soldier deployed to the same location category but with no 
such experience. A soldier who fires a weapon while deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan is 
4.5 percentage points (18.4-13.9=4.5) more likely to reenlist compared to a soldier 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with no such experience. The 4.5 percentage point 
difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that there is indeed 
differential effect on reenlistment rates between this type of combat exposure that occur 
in the two different location categories.  A soldier exposed to destroyed military vehicles 
while deployed outside Iraq or Afghanistan is 7.3 percentage points (p<.10) more likely 
to reenlist than a soldier deployed to the same location category but with no such 
experience.  The effects of exposure to destroyed vehicles in Iraq or Afghanistan is not 
statistically significant indicating there is no differential effect on reenlistment rates 
between soldiers who are exposed to destroyed vehicle outside Iraq or Afghanistan and 
soldiers exposed to destroyed vehicles while deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan.  The 
reenlistment effects of deployments remain relatively unchanged from the previous 
models. 
In a sensitivity analysis Model Four is further refined by separating out combat 
exposures that occur in Iraq from those that occurred in Afghanistan; the estimated 
effects have large standard errors and the results observed in Model Four are largely 
driven by the combat exposures in Iraq. 
 Summary 
Deployments have a positive effect on the reenlistment rate and remain relatively 
unchanged across each model specification.  The average rate of reenlistment for U.S. 
Army personnel that were deployed is 31.8%; one can therefore assess the magnitude of 
the effect (in terms of percent change in reenlistment rate) by dividing the coefficients 
reported in the previous models by this average reenlistment rate.  Across each model 
specification, combat exposure has a positive effect on soldiers reenlistment rates if the 
effect is statistically significant and the combat exposure that appears to have the largest 
effect on reenlistment rate for soldiers is firing a weapon while deployed outside Iraq or 
Afghanistan.   
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C. LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST  
A likelihood ratio test is used to evaluate the difference between nested models 
and compares the log-likelihood function of restricted and unrestricted models.  For this 
study, the unrestricted model is the fully specified model described in Chapter V and the 
restricted model omits the combat exposure variables.  While removing the combat 
exposure variables from each model will almost always make the model fit less well, the 
likelihood ratio test compares the log likelihood of the restricted and unrestricted models 
and tests whether any difference between the two is statistically significant.  If the 
difference is statistically significant, then the unrestricted model (combat exposure 
variables included) is considered to fit the data significantly better than the restricted 
model (combat exposure variables omitted) and therefore the combat exposure variables 
belong in the model specification.  Likelihood ratio test p-values are displayed in each 
table; a p-value less than .05 is interpreted to mean that the inclusion of the combat 
exposure variables results in a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the 
model.  After completing a likelihood ratio test for each model and for each of the two 
outcomes, the inclusion of combat exposure variables results in a statistically significant 
improvement in the fit of the model at the 5% significant level, except in the following 
three cases: 
• Reenlistment Model Two for U.S. Air Force personnel. 
• Attrition Models One and Two for U.S. Navy personnel. 
• It is not unexpected that the combat exposure variables are insignificant 
for members of the U.S. Navy since most are confined to their ship and 
only a few have an opportunity for the combat exposure measured by the 
PDHA. 
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS WITH PAY GRADE CONTROLS 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted to examine the stability of each model’s key 
variables where the outcome is reenlistment.  Specifically, the analysis examines if the 
coefficients of the key variables change when pay grade variables were added to each of 
the models.  Pay grade is a significant predictor of a service member staying past his or 
her initial service obligation; higher pay grades may be indicative of a service member’s 
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propensity for and skill in military service. At the same time, pay grade may be a proxy 
for the complexity of the duties and stress during a deployment in a hostile area.  
For Marines and Air Force, none of the combat exposure variables significantly 
changed with the inclusion on pay grade variables in to the model thus concluding that 
the models are stable for Marine Corps and Air Force personnel. For the Navy, including 
pay grade makes coefficients of the two variables that account for a sailor who fired a 
weapon from the air and witnessing the death or injury of an enemy combatant during 
deployment became statistically significant in the reenlistment model: 
• Fired a weapon during a deployment (Model One) 
• Fired a weapon from the land (Model Two) 
• Fired a weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan (Model Three) 
• Exposure to destroyed military vehicles in Iraq or Afghanistan (Model 
Four). 
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS WITH DEPLOYMENT CONTROLS 
Sensitivity analysis was also conducted to examine the stability of each model’s 
key variables when controlling for deployment tempo and duration.  Variables that 
account for deployment duration and tempo were not included in the original 
specification because they are highly correlated with combat exposure; the more times a 
service member deploys the more likely that member is to be exposed to combat 
situations.  Specifically, the analysis examines if the coefficients of the key variables 
change when variables that measure days deployed during first enlistment period and 
being deployed more than once where included in each model specification.   
1. Sensitivity Analysis for Marine Corps Personnel 
None of the combat exposure variables significantly changed with the inclusion of 
deployment variables into the reenlistment model thus concluding that the reenlistment 
models are stable for Marine Corps personnel.  However, when deployment variables 
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were included in the attrition models the combat exposure variables showed less stability.  
Instability was most pronounced in attrition Models Two and Three, and is detailed 
below: 
• Model Two: Firing a weapon from land and witnessing the death of a 
civilian became statistically significant and increased the attrition rate by 
2.9 and 2.2 percentage points respectively (p<.05).  Witnessing the death 
of a coalition member, while negative and statistically significant without 
deployment controls, became statistically insignificant and positive after 
inclusion of deployment controls. 
• Model Three: Firing a weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan became statistically 
significant and resulted in a 3.1 percentage point increase in attrition rate 
(p<.01).  However, effect of exposure to destroyed military vehicles in 
Iraq or Afghanistan became statistically insignificant. 
2. Sensitivity Analysis for Navy Personnel 
The combat exposure variables in both the reenlistment and attrition models for 
Navy personnel demonstrated stability when deployment variables were included in 
model specification.  The only combat exposure variable that changed significance level 
was firing a weapon from the air as it became statistically significant in the reenlistment 
model. 
3. Sensitivity Analysis for Air Force Personnel 
The combat exposure variables in both the reenlistment and attrition models for 
Air Force personnel demonstrated stability when deployment variables were included in 
model specification.  Exposure to destroyed military vehicles while deployed to locations 
outside Iraq or Afghanistan lost statistical significance when deployment variables where 




4. Sensitivity Analysis for Army Personnel 
Combat exposure variables that were once significant became statistically 
insignificant when deployment variables were included in the model specification.  The 
variables that became insignificant in the attrition models include: 
• Fired a weapon from the land 
• Exposure to destroyed military vehicles outside Iraq or Afghanistan 
• Fired a weapon outside Iraq or Afghanistan. 
The reenlistment models for service members in the U.S. Army showed more 
stability.  Although some variables lost statistical significance, the magnitude of the 
coefficients look similar to those in the original model (changing less than one percentage 
point).  Therefore, one can conclude that because the deployment control variables 
included in this sensitivity analysis are highly collinear with the combat exposure 
variables the result was larger standard errors and decreased statistical significance in 
some variables.  The combat exposure variables that lost statistical significance include:    
• Fired a weapon during deployment 
• Fired a weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan 
• Fired a weapon from the land. 
F. SUMMARY 
Witnessing death or injury during deployment increases the attrition rates of a 
soldiers and Marines, has no significant effect on sailors, and has a negative effect on Air 
Force personnel attrition rates.  Witnessing the death or injury of enemy combatants 
increases the attrition rate for soldiers while it decreases the attrition rate for sailors and 
airmen.  Witnessing the death or injury of coalition members only has an effect on 
Marine Corps personnel and lowers the attrition rate for Marines who were deployed and 
saw the death of coalition members compared to deployed Marines who did not witness 
such an event.  For combat exposure that occurs specifically in Iraq or Afghanistan 
witnessing death increases soldiers and Marines attrition rates and decreases the attrition 
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rates of airmen.  Exposure to destroyed vehicles in Iraq or Afghanistan decreases attrition 
rates for all Services except the Air Force where it increases the attrition rate.  Soldiers 
and Marines experience differential effects of combat exposure on attrition rates between 
combat exposure that occurs in Iraq or Afghanistan and combat exposure that occurs 
elsewhere.  Members of the U.S. Army experience differential effects between those who 
fire their weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan, and those that fire their weapons while deployed 
elsewhere while in the Marine Corps. The differential effect on attrition rates occur 
between those who saw a person killed or injured in Iraq or Afghanistan and those that 
witnessed death while deployed to other locations. 
Across each of the Services, deployments reduce the rate of attrition.  Deployment 
to Iraq or Afghanistan and deployments to other locations all decrease attrition rates that 
range from 41.2 percentage points (soldiers with deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan) to 
12.6 percentage points (Marines with deployments to Afghanistan).  A careful 
interpretation is needed for the deployment effects on attrition rates; deployments alone 
do not reduce attrition rates.  Those who are able to deploy have completed the entry-
level training (when attrition rates are highest) specific to their MOS and other 
deployment-specific training requirements and have progressed past a point in their 
careers where much early attrition occurs.  The attrition results for deployment are 
spurious and the models show that deployment reduces attrition but only because 
individuals who separated early have not had the opportunity to deploy. 
Combat exposure has a uniformly positive impact on reenlistment rates for 
service members in the U.S. Army and includes a differential effect on reenlistment rates 
between those who fire their weapon in Iraq or Afghanistan and those who fire their 
weapons while deployed elsewhere.  Conversely, combat exposure has a negative impact 
on reenlistment rates for service members in the Marine Corps.  Marines also experience 
a differential effect on reenlistment rates between those who witnessed death or injury in 
Iraq or Afghanistan and those who witnessed death or injury while deployed elsewhere.  
Combat exposure has both positive and negative impacts on the reenlistment rates for 
service members in the U.S. Navy.  Discharging a weapon while deployed (regardless of 
location) and discharging a weapon while deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan each decrease 
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reenlistment rates for sailors who report those instances compared to sailors who were 
deployed to the same locations and did not have such experiences.  Exposure to destroyed 
military vehicles while deployed (regardless of location) and while deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan result in an increase in the reenlistment rate for sailors who report such 
exposure compared to sailors who were deployed and did not report such exposure.  
Combat exposure generally increases the reenlistment rate for service members in the 
U.S. Air Force and airmen experience a differential effect on reenlistment rates between 
those who witness death and are exposed to destroyed military vehicles in Iraq or 
Afghanistan and those who experience those two situations elsewhere. 
Across each of the Service, deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan increase the 
reenlistment rate for service members that range from a 10 percent point (p<.01)  increase 
in the reenlistment rate of sailors to a 2.2 percentage point (p<.05) increase in the 
reenlistment rate of airmen.  Deployment to other locations also has a positive impact on 
the reenlistment of all service members except those in the Navy.  Service members in 
the Army enjoy the largest increase in reenlistment rates due to deployment to other 
locations with approximately a 3.3 percentage point (p<.01) increase in the reenlistment 
rate.  Conversely, service members in the Navy who have been deployed to other 
locations experience a decrease reenlistment rates of approximately 3.6 percentage points 
(p<.01).  As demonstrated in other studies and confirmed here service members without a 
traditional high school diploma are less likely to reenlist and service members who are 
married with non-spousal dependents are more likely to reenlist. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis developed four alternate probit model specifications to predict 
reenlistment and attrition probabilities of first-term enlisted service members in the U.S. 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.  The goal was to determine the effect that 
combat exposure has on service member’s propensity to reenlist or separate before the 
end of their obligated service. 
Answers to the primary research question, whether combat experiences affect 
first-term enlisted retention and attrition rates, vary depending on the Service. The results 
of the multivariate models show that witnessing the death or serious injury of enemy 
combatants while deployed increases attrition rates among soldiers and Marines by 4.5 
and 3.3 percentage points, respectively, compared to soldiers and Marines deployed to 
the same location category without such an experience.  The same exposure lead to a 
decrease in attrition rates for sailors and airmen that range from 10.2 to 9.3 percentage 
points respectively compared to those deployed to the same location category without 
that experience.  Only Marine Corps personnel are significantly affected by the death of 
coalition members; Marines who witnessed a coalition member’s death or injury have a 
2.2 percentage point decrease in their attrition rates compared to a Marine who was 
deployed to a similar location but had no such exposure.  Exposure to destroyed military 
vehicles leads to decreases in attrition rate among soldiers, sailors, and Marines that 
range from 8.6 percentage points (p<.05) for sailors to 2.5 percentage points (p<.01) for 
Marines.  Airmen who are exposed to destroyed military vehicles experience a 12.4 
percentage point increase (p<.01) increased attrition rate compared to airmen who are 
deployed to similar locations but lack that experience. 
Among service members who have completed at least 36 months of active duty 
service (24 months for Army three year contracts) combat exposure that is statistically 
significant generally increases retention rate among service members in the Army and Air 
Force but decreases retention rate for service members in the Navy and Marine Corps.  
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Witnessing a person’s death while deployed decreases Marine retention rates by 3.6 
percentage points (p<.01) compared to a Marine who was deployed to a similar location 
and had no such experience; witnessing the death of an enemy combatant had a larger 
effect on Marine attrition rates than witnessing a coalition member’s death.  Firing a 
weapon increases Army and Air Force retention rates by 1.7 and 14.1 percentage points 
respectively.   Conversely, firing a weapon decreases Navy and Marine Corps retention 
rates by 9.1 and 2.6 percentage points respectively.  Exposure to destroyed military 
vehicles increases retention rates among service members in the Army and Navy that 
range from 2 to 17.1 percentage points; members of the Marine Corps and Air Force who 
experience destroyed military vehicles do not experience a statistically significant change 
in their retention rates. 
The study further explores whether combat exposures that occurred in Iraq or 
Afghanistan have a differential effect on retention and attrition compared to combat 
exposure that occurred in other locations.  The differential effect is only observed in 
Marines and solders.  Specifically, retention and attrition rates differ significantly 
between Marines who have witnessed an individual’s death while deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan and those who have witnessed an individual’s death or serious injury while 
deployed elsewhere.  Likewise, retention and attrition rates differ significantly between 
soldiers who have fired their weapons in Iraq or Afghanistan and those who have fired 
their weapons while deployed elsewhere.  These differentials in attrition and retention 
rates could be indicative of deployment preparedness; it is hypothesized that service 
members being deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan were more prepared for combat exposure 
than those preparing to be deployed elsewhere. 
B. STUDY LIMITATIONS  
The study has the following limitations.  First, this study focused on only two 
cohort years (2002 and 2003) and used the PDHA DD Form 2796 that was used from 
April 2003 through December 2007.  The DD Form 2796 used from January 2008 to the 
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present asks more specific questions regarding combat experiences32 and could provide 
more detailed analysis of the experiences that might affect retention and attrition.  Since 
the study focuses only on first term enlisted, the combat exposure might have a 
differential effect on those beyond the first term.  Thus, the results from this study might 
not be applicable to the general active duty population. 
Second, due to privacy concerns, I only obtain individual’s enlistment date and 
separate date in a more aggregated level: those information are recorded in year quarter.  
Such aggregation introduces measurement errors in the dependent variables, and might 
cause attenuation bias in the estimated effects.  Third, the PHDA questions on combat 
experience, while capture the experience in a rather objective language, do not capture 
the severity of each event.  Finally, the PDHA doesn’t track the number of times the same 
combat related experience occurs during the same deployment.  For instance, a service 
member who fired his or her weapon one time during deployment and another service 
member who fired a weapon dozens of times during the same deployment would each 
simply check “yes” to the PDHA question that asks if a service member fired a weapon 
and thus would have identical responses to that particular question on the PDHA.  Some 
of the variations in the combat exposure effects on retention and attrition across Services 
might be due to the fact that each Service encounters different levels of severity for any 
given type of combat exposure.  Fourth, the occupational categories used in the analysis 
are based on the person’s trained MOS, and might not reflect the actual job assignment 
for his particular deployment.  It is possible that the estimated effects of combat exposure 
might be confounded with the job assignment, but the amount of bias should be minimal 
given that most people would stay within their trained specialty.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It would be important for the DoD to continue monitor how the current 
deployment tempo and combat exposures affect retention and attrition in the military, 
                                                 
32 The DD Form 2796 dated Jan 2008 asks specifically if a respondent was involved in a blast or 
explosion or vehicular accident/crash.  The DD Form 2796 also asks specifically about physical symptoms 
associated with those events. 
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given the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and other parts of Africa and Middle East.  
Future research utilizing the new PDHA data (i.e., those administered after January 2008) 
could provide more detailed analysis of the combat experiences that might affect 
retention and attrition.  For instance, the new PDHA forms administered after January 
2008 directly ask service members if they were exposed to explosions during 
deployment, not simply their exposure to destroyed military vehicles.  Since some 
findings do show that combat exposure predicts manpower losses utilization of pre-
deployment training that focuses specifically on the physical or psychological reactions 
to the combat exposure events measured by the PDHA should be examined to better 
prepare service members for combat deployments.  Early attrition and negative retention 
effects was more pronounced among some service members who had combat exposure 
outside Iraq or Afghanistan than by members who had the same exposure inside Iraq or 
Afghanistan; Marines who witnessed injury or death outside Iraq or Afghanistan were 
11.8 percentage points more likely to attrite while Marines with the same experience in 
Iraq or Afghanistan were only 3.3 percentage points more likely to attrite.  It would be 
useful to examine which specific training or deployment preparation, if any, received by 
the Iraq or Afghanistan group can be provided to members deploying outside Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  This training could help offset the disproportionately larger negative 
attrition effects associated with combat exposure in those locales.   Finally, a renewed 
emphasis on post-deployment health concerns could address a service member’s 
problems or issues as they arise before they become grounds for early separation.  While 
combat exposure among service members during deployment is an unavoidable but at 
times necessary duty, understanding how such experiences affect retention and attrition 
behavior will allow manpower planners to better predict recruitment and retention goals 
during times of military conflict.  
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APPENDIX A.  POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH ASSESSMENT 
QUESTIONNAIRE (DD FORM 2796)  
DD Form 2796 is required for all deployments outside the United States 
(OCONUS) greater than 30 days, and is recommended; however, at the discretion of the 
Component Commander, Service Component Commander, or commander exercising 
operation control during all deployments less than or equal to 30 days, deployments with 
a fixed military treatment facility (MTF), or for deployments within the Continental 
United States (CONUS) 33 .  Those required to complete a PDHA must do so no sooner 
than 30 days before re-deployment to no later than 30 days after return to their home 
station.   
                                                 
33 DoD Instruction 6490.03 provides full instructive and administrative guidance for the 
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APPENDIX C.  PROBIT REGRESSIONS FOR MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL 
 Reenlistment Attrition 
Combat Exposure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  -0.036***     -0.139*** 0.031***     0.118***
during ANY deployment (0.007)     (0.031) (0.010)     (0.035) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment -0.026***     -0.094* 0.005     -0.046 
  (0.007)     (0.055) (0.010)     (0.058) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected -0.000 -0.002   0.030 -0.025*** -0.022***   -0.001 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.007) (0.007)   (0.036) (0.008) (0.009)   (0.040) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.004 -0.261*** -0.254***-0.258***-0.257***
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Deployed to other location 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.029*** -0.158*** -0.158***-0.158***-0.163***
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    -0.018**       0.013     
during deployment   (0.008)       (0.011)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    -0.091*       -0.089     
during deployment   (0.050)       (0.091)     
Discharged weapon from the SEA    -0.025       -0.008     
during deployment   (0.103)       (0.137)     
Ever saw a COALITION member    -0.013*       -0.022**     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.007)       (0.009)     
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
Combat Exposure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Ever saw an ENEMY    -0.033***       0.033***     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.008)       (0.011)     
Ever saw a CIVILIAN   0.005       0.012     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.008)       (0.010)     
Ever reported seeing individual killed,      -0.030*** 0.125***     0.023** -0.085***
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.040)     (0.010) (0.031) 
Ever reported firing any weapon in      -0.027*** 0.081     0.008 0.058 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.079)     (0.010) (0.067) 
Ever reported being inside or inspected      -0.003 -0.030     -0.025*** -0.024 
destroyed military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.032)     (0.009) (0.040) 
Race/Ethnicity         
Black 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082***
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Hispanic -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.037*** -0.037***-0.037***-0.037***
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Other 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 -0.028* -0.028* -0.028* -0.028* 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Unknown 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** -0.027** -0.027** -0.027** -0.027**
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
Gender Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Female 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.020* 0.019* 0.019* 0.020* 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age         
Age -0.013***-0.013***-0.013*** -0.013*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education Level         
Non High School Diploma or GED Grad -0.156***-0.156***-0.156*** -0.156*** 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.026 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Some college, no bachelor degree -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Bachelors degree 0.092** 0.093** 0.092** 0.091** -0.081*** -0.082***-0.082***-0.081***
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Postgraduate degree 0.442*** 0.443*** 0.443*** 0.442*** -0.068*** -0.067***-0.068***-0.068***
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Year of Entry         
2002 Cohort -0.345***-0.345***-0.345*** -0.344***         
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)         
2003 Cohort         -0.020* -0.019 -0.020* -0.020 
          (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
AFQT Score Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
AFQT score >=93 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.094*** -0.113*** -0.114***-0.113***-0.112***
  (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
AFQT score 65-92 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.079*** -0.082*** -0.082***-0.082***-0.082***
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
AFQT score 50-64 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.088*** -0.043*** -0.043***-0.043***-0.042***
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
AFQT score 31-49 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
MOS         
Combat Arms -0.027* -0.029** -0.028** -0.027* -0.354*** -0.354***-0.353***-0.353***
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Combat Service -0.049***-0.049***-0.049*** -0.049*** -0.334*** -0.334***-0.334***-0.334***
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Service Support -0.050***-0.051***-0.050*** -0.050*** -0.413*** -0.413***-0.413***-0.413***
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Marital Status         
Single with Dependents 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.047*** -0.086*** -0.085***-0.086***-0.086***
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Married 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** -0.092*** -0.092***-0.092***-0.092***
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
Marital Status Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Married with non-spousal dependents 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.043*** -0.107*** -0.107***-0.107***-0.107***
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
LR Chi2 67.73 65.33 56.19 83.48 16.74 28.11 12.31 24.58 
Prob>Chi2 .0000 .000 .0000 .0000 .0008 .0002 .0064 .0004 
Observations 30654 30654 30654 30654 41607 41607 41607 41607 
Standard errors in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 104
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 105
APPENDIX D.  PROBIT REGRESSIONS FOR NAVY PERSONNEL 
 Reenlistment Attrition 
Combat Exposure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  -0.003     -0.017 -0.012     0.001 
during ANY deployment (0.023)     (0.026) (0.019)     (0.022) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment -0.091**     -0.105 0.017     0.051 
  (0.042)     (0.078) (0.035)     (0.045) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected 0.171*** 0.167***   0.079 -0.086** -0.060   0.028 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.050) (0.050)   (0.073) (0.040) (0.041)   (0.053) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.084*** 0.084*** -0.167*** -0.153*** -0.150*** -0.150***
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Deployed to other location -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.145*** -0.146***
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    -0.027       0.033     
during deployment   (0.065)       (0.058)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    -0.167       -0.146     
during deployment   (0.111)       (0.194)     
Discharged weapon from the SEA    -0.205**       0.043     
during deployment   (0.084)       (0.076)     
Ever saw a COALITION member    -0.002       0.001     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.031)       (0.025)     
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
Combat Exposure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Ever saw an ENEMY    -0.041       -0.102**     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.045)       (0.047)     
Ever saw a CIVILIAN   0.006       -0.012     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.031)       (0.027)     
Ever reported seeing individual killed,      0.026 0.045     -0.029 -0.030 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.048) (0.057)     (0.042) (0.048) 
Ever reported firing any weapon in      -0.109** -0.006     0.012 -0.041 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.049) (0.121)     (0.058) (0.078) 
Ever reported being inside or inspected      0.226*** 0.136     -0.166*** -0.196**
destroyed military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.070) (0.103)     (0.060) (0.084) 
Race/Ethnicity         
Black 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Hispanic -0.061** -0.062** -0.061** -0.061** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.075***
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Other -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.053***
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Unknown -0.085* -0.084* -0.084* -0.085* -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
Gender Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Female -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039***
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age         
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education Level         
Non High School Diploma or GED Grad -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085***
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Some college, no bachelor degree -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104***
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Bachelors degree 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.122*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.147***
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Postgraduate degree 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.057** 0.056** 0.057** 0.057** 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Year of Entry         
2002 Cohort -0.526*** -0.525*** -0.526*** -0.526*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247***
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
2003 Cohort                 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
AFQT Score Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
AFQT score >=93 0.123* 0.123* 0.122* 0.122* -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
AFQT score 65-92 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
AFQT score 50-64 -0.081 -0.081 -0.082 -0.082 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
AFQT score 31-49 -0.125** -0.125** -0.126** -0.126** 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
MOS         
Combat Arms -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.471*** -0.471*** -0.471*** -0.471***
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Combat Service -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.572*** -0.572*** -0.572*** -0.572***
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Service Support -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.546*** -0.546*** -0.546*** -0.546***
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Marital Status         
Single with Dependents 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043***
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Married 0.016** 0.016** 0.017** 0.016** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.091***
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
Marital Status Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Married with non-spousal dependents 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106***
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
LR Chi2 15.07 16.08 15.54 18.49 6.10 12.82 13.28 14.79 
Prob>Chi2 .0018 .0244 .0014 .0051 .1079 .0766 .0041 .0219 
Observations 22106 22106 22106 22106 40938 40938 40938 40938 
Standard errors in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX E.  PROBIT REGRESSIONS FOR AIR FORCE PERSONNEL 
 Reenlistment Attrition 
Combat Exposure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  0.009     0.088** -0.049**     -0.059 
during ANY deployment (0.016)     (0.042) (0.024)     (0.049) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment 0.141***     0.161 0.013     0.067 
  (0.047)     (0.106) (0.058)     (0.111) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected 0.001 0.008   0.155* 0.124*** 0.117***   0.129 
any destroyed military vehicle (0.025) (0.025)   (0.084) (0.036) (0.037)   (0.087) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 0.016 0.016 0.022** 0.022** -0.305*** -0.306*** -0.305*** -0.305***
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Deployed to other location 0.018** 0.020** 0.020** 0.014 -0.292*** -0.293*** -0.293*** -0.292***
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    0.024       0.084     
during deployment   (0.049)       (0.073)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    -0.148***       -0.066     
during deployment   (0.038)       (0.231)     
Discharged weapon from the SEA                  
during deployment                 
Ever saw a COALITION member    -0.001       -0.027     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.020)       (0.030)     
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
Combat Exposure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Ever saw an ENEMY    0.039       -0.093**     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.028)       (0.039)     
Ever saw a CIVILIAN   0.013       0.032     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.026)       (0.040)     
Ever reported seeing individual killed,      -0.008 -0.074***     -0.045* 0.013 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.017) (0.027)     (0.027) (0.058) 
Ever reported firing any weapon in      0.149*** -0.008     -0.008 -0.071 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.053) (0.081)     (0.068) (0.121) 
Ever reported being inside or inspected      -0.020 -0.110***     0.123*** -0.005 
destroyed military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.025) (0.033)     (0.040) (0.093) 
Race/Ethnicity         
Black -0.055* -0.054* -0.055* -0.054* 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050***
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Hispanic -0.058 -0.058 -0.058 -0.057 -0.034* -0.035* -0.034* -0.034* 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Other 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.020 -0.038* -0.039* -0.038* -0.038* 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Unknown -0.089 -0.090 -0.088 -0.088 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
Gender Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Female -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.101***
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age         
Age 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education Level         
Non High School Diploma or GED Grad         0.014 0.016 0.014 0.013 
          (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
Some college, no bachelor degree -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.043 -0.042 -0.043 -0.043 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Bachelors degree -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Postgraduate degree -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027** -0.027** -0.027** -0.027**
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Year of Entry         
2002 Cohort -0.507*** -0.509*** -0.507*** -0.507*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.130***
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
2003 Cohort                 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
AFQT Score Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
AFQT score >=93 -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** 0.349*** 0.350*** 0.349*** 0.349***
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
AFQT score 65-92 -0.356*** -0.356*** -0.355*** -0.356*** 0.394*** 0.394*** 0.394*** 0.394***
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
AFQT score 50-64 -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.255*** 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.469***
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
AFQT score 31-49 -0.257*** -0.258*** -0.257*** -0.257*** 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.462***
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
MOS         
Combat Arms 0.029* 0.031* 0.030* 0.027* -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.277***
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Combat Service 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.039*** -0.300*** -0.299*** -0.299*** -0.300***
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Service Support 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.053*** -0.247*** -0.246*** -0.246*** -0.246***
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Marital Status         
Single with Dependents 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** -0.143*** -0.144*** -0.143*** -0.143***
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Married 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049***
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
Marital Status Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Married with non-spousal dependents 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.096*** -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.135***
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
LR Chi2 13.66 8.40 10.66 25.69 13.53 18.68 10.27 13.89 
Prob>Chi2 .0034 .2099 .0137 .0003 .0036 .0047 .0164 .0309 
Observations 13266 13265 13266 13266 22775 22773 22775 22775 
Standard errors in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX F.  PROBIT REGRESSIONS FOR ARMY PERSONNEL 
 Reenlistment Attrition 
 Combat Exposure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Saw individual killed, wounded, or dead  -0.002     -0.031 0.022***     -0.015 
during ANY deployment (0.007)     (0.033) (0.007)     (0.034) 
Fired their weapon during a deployment 0.017**     0.184*** -0.014*     -0.116* 
  (0.007)     (0.061) (0.008)     (0.061) 
Inside, entered, or closely inspected 0.020*** 0.018***   0.073* -0.052*** -0.050***   -0.101**
any destroyed military vehicle (0.007) (0.007)   (0.042) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.042) 
Has been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.042*** -0.412*** -0.408*** -0.414*** -0.414***
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Deployed to other location 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.026** -0.278*** -0.277*** -0.280*** -0.268***
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Discharged weapon from the LAND    0.015*       -0.023***     
during deployment   (0.008)       (0.009)     
Discharged weapon from the AIR    0.066       0.034     
during deployment   (0.071)       (0.068)     
Discharged weapon from the SEA    -0.043       0.102     
during deployment   (0.115)       (0.117)     
Ever saw a COALITION member    0.002       -0.009     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.007)       (0.008)     
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
 Combat Exposure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Ever saw an ENEMY    0.006       0.045***     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.008)       (0.008)     
Ever saw a CIVILIAN   0.000       -0.010     
killed, wounded, or dead   (0.007)       (0.008)     
Ever reported seeing individual killed,      -0.001 0.030     0.025*** 0.040 
wounded, or dead in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.035)     (0.008) (0.034) 
Ever reported firing any weapon in      0.014* -0.139***     -0.013 0.099* 
Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.008) (0.042)     (0.008) (0.058) 
Ever reported being inside or inspected      0.018*** -0.051     -0.051*** 0.049 
destroyed military vehicle in Iraq or Afghanistan     (0.007) (0.037)     (0.007) (0.042) 
Race/Ethnicity         
Black 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Hispanic -0.027* -0.026* -0.027* -0.027* -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090***
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Other -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136***
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Unknown -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
 Gender Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Female -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.127***
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age         
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education Level         
Non High School Diploma or GED Grad -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 0.082** 0.084*** 0.082** 0.083** 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Some college, no bachelor degree 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032***
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Bachelors degree 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.254***
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Postgraduate degree -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.103***
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Year of Entry         
2002 Cohort -0.488*** -0.488*** -0.488*** -0.488*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.128***
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
2003 Cohort -0.250*** -0.250*** -0.250*** -0.250*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046***
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
   
 120
 Reenlistment Attrition 
 AFQT Score Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
AFQT score >=93 -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.106***
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
AFQT score 65-92 -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136*** 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
AFQT score 50-64 -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.151*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077***
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
AFQT score 31-49 -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.170*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.075***
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
MOS         
Combat Arms -0.025* -0.026* -0.024* -0.026* -0.251*** -0.250*** -0.251*** -0.250***
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Combat Service -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.290*** -0.290*** -0.290*** -0.290***
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Service Support 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.048*** -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.231*** -0.231***
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Marital Status         
Single with Dependents 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055***
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Married 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.065***
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
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 Reenlistment Attrition 
Marital Status Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Married with non-spousal dependents 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064***
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
LR Chi2 21.37 24.10 15.91 35.71 61.50 84.03 55.51 73.67 
Prob>Chi2 .0001 .0011 .0012 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Observations 39541 39541 39541 39541 74828 74828 74828 74828 
Standard errors in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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